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Undo Hardship: An Argument for
Affirmative Action as a Mandatory Remedy
in Systemic Racial Discrimination Cases
Kenneth R. Davis*
I. Introduction
Denounced by some and praised by others, affirmative action
inflames emotions and incites debate.1 Critics label affirmative action a
euphemism, a twist of linguistic chicanery that condones reverse
discrimination.2 Supporters hail it as an enlightened imperative for
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1969; M.A., California State University at Long Beach, 1971; J.D., University of Toledo
College of Law, 1977. I wish to thank Professors Donna Gitter, Tristin Green, and
Lawrence Roberts for reviewing this article. I also express my appreciation to my wife
Jean Davis, law librarian extraordinaire, for her invaluable research assistance.
1. The controversy over affirmative action seems inexhaustible. Responding to
reports that Lawrence Summers, the ex-Secretary of the Treasury and current President of
Harvard University, had upset members of Harvard's department of Afro-American
Studies, Jesse Jackson delivered a speech in which he characterized Harvard's
"uncertainty about affirmative action" as "disturbing." Megan Tench, 2 Black Leaders
Confront Harvard; Jackson, Sharpton Demand Answers, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 2002, at
B1. During his speech at the Republican convention, Colin Powell castigated some
within his party "who miss no opportunity to roundly and loudly condemn affirmative
action that helped a few thousands black kids get an education, but you hardly hear a
whimper when it's affirmative action for lobbyists who load our federal tax code with
preferences for special interests." Thomas B. Edsall, Bush Plays Down Split With
Powell; Affirmative Action Stances Show Divide, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2000, at A20.
Ward Connerly, a nationally known figure who campaigned successfully to end the
University of California's race-based program to boost the admission of black students,
declared at a debate conducted at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University: "A child whose parents never went to college, yes, that child needs
affirmative action. But never, never do we look at the color of somebody's skin. That
violates every belief that I think we ought to have." Agnes Blum, At Issue: Does
Affirmative Action Serve Racial Equality? BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2002, at B5; see
Nichole Aksamit, Black Female Fire Captain Complains of Harassment, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Mar. 27, 2002, at B4 (reporting that a black female fire captain complained that
white male co-workers "jumped" her for supporting an affirmative action plan).
2. TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIvE ACTION: THE CASE FOR COLORBLIND
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achieving social justice.3 Sometimes the rhetoric is overheated and
accusatory. A University of Tennessee student announced at the
University of Michigan's Ann Arbor campus: "Either you're for racism,
injustice, and inequality, or you're for justice and equality-which is
affirmative action."4 Occasionally the message turns ugly. At the same
campus, graffiti scrawled in yellow chalk declared: "Only niggers want
affirmative action."
5
An approach to break the stranglehold of racial discrimination,
affirmative action takes a person's race into account in making decisions,
particularly in the areas of employment and education.6 Affirmative
action is predominantly voluntary. Its success in the workplace depends
on the good will of employers who choose to consider race in hiring and
promotion decisions. Even freedom to do good deeds has its limits.
Because affirmative action plans sometimes unfairly penalize
unprotected workers, voluntary affirmative action plans must conform to
the legal requirements of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Title
VII). 7  To prevent voluntary affirmative action programs from
deteriorating into platforms for reverse discrimination, the Supreme
Court, in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber 8 and Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 9 held that affirmative action plans must apply
only to job categories in which minorities are traditionally
underrepresented. 10 Such plans may not exalt race over merit as a job
JUSTICE 196 (1996) ("Preferential treatment is never benign. Whoever would have been
admitted to a school, or won the promotion or the contract, but for race, has suffered
discrimination-and there is no good discrimination.").
3. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1 (2000) ("Racial
minorities point to Dred Scott's insistence on racial castes, Plessy's endorsement of
official segregation, and Brown's reluctance to remedy unlawful discrimination as
evidence that the white majority is inevitably inclined to advance its own interests at
minority expense. Minority group members, therefore, tend to argue that the only way to
arrest this majoritarian inclination is through the use of race-conscious remedial programs
that will ensure an equitable distribution of resources.").
4. Jordan Schrader, Students Defend Affirmative Action 'by Any Means Necessary,'
MICH. DAILY, Feb. 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 12485145.
5. Karen Schwartz, Racist Message Left in Chalk on U. Michigan Campus, MICH.
DAILY, Mar. 19, 2002.
6. Affirmative action can apply to any group. Although most commonly focused
on racial minorities and women, affirmative action plans have sought to benefit groups
such as veterans, the disabled, religious groups, gays and lesbians, residents of particular
states, and even athletes and children of university alumni. See SEX, RACE & MERIT:
DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT 3 (Faye J. Crosby &
Cheryl VanDeVeer eds., 2000); SPANN, supra note 3, at 5. This article, however, will
concentrate on affirmative action for African-Americans.
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2002).
8. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
9. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
10. See infra Part II.A (discussing the elements of a voluntary affirmative action




The duty to make reasonable accommodations for employees is
legally distinct from affirmative action, but the two concepts are
interwoven. This duty finds limited application under Title VII, for
while a diluted version of reasonable accommodation applies to religious
discrimination cases, 12 it does not apply at all to cases of discrimination
based on race, sex, or national origin. The duty to provide reasonable
accommodations, however, is indispensable in disability cases. Most
notably, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires
employers make reasonable accommodations for individuals with
disabilities who can perform essential job functions when such
accommodations are in place.13
11. See id.
12. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), Hardison's
religious beliefs required that he observe the Sabbath on Saturdays. Such religious
observance conflicted with his work schedule, which had to accommodate seniority rights
arising from a collective bargaining agreement. Trans World Airlines (TWA) tried to
accommodate Hardison in two ways: by authorizing the shop steward to search for
someone to swap shifts with him and by attempting to find him another job. Neither
solution worked. The Court held that TWA did not have to carve out a special exception
to the collective bargaining agreement to accommodate Hardison, because collective
bargaining agreements are central to national labor policy, and this agreement was not
used for discriminatory purposes. Id. at 79-82. The Court also rejected the suggestion
that TWA should have permitted Hardison to work a four-day week, or should have
replaced Hardison with another worker on Saturdays, because both proposed
accommodations would have proven costly to TWA. Id. at 84. The Court stated: "To
require TWA to bear more than a de minimus cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off
is an undue hardship." Id. In Ansonia v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986), Philbrook's
religion required him to miss six days of work each year. Id. at 63. As a teacher subject
to a collective bargaining agreement, Philbrook was entitled to only three days for
religious observance. Personal days were unavailable for this purpose. Id. When
Philbrook took three unauthorized days off, the school board docked his pay. Philbrook
requested the school board grant him one of two accommodations. First, he asked for
permission to use three personal days for religious observance. Id. Second, he offered to
pay the cost of a substitute teacher for the three days, asking in return to receive full pay.
Id. The school board rejected both suggestions. The Supreme Court held that, once an
employer reasonably accommodates the religious needs of an employee, the employer
has no further duty to meet the desires of the employee. Id. at 68. The question was
whether the three days' religious leave provided by the collective bargaining agreement
was a reasonable accommodation. The Court answered this question by stating that the
school board was not required to allow Philbrook to use three personal days for religious
purposes unless personal days could be used for any purposes other than religious ones.
Since this very issue was in dispute, the Court remanded the case for further findings. Id.
at 70-71; see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 9.3.2 (2d
ed. 1988) (suggesting that the duty to provide reasonable accommodations in religious
discrimination cases protects the interests of the majority of employees rather than the
interests of the individual, but inferring that the Court would have ruled against the
school board if Philbrook had lost his job because of religious observance).
13. Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, which applies to employers with
at least fifteen employees, creates a duty to make reasonable accommodations for
disabled employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2002). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
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In passing the ADA and creating the employer's duty to make
reasonable accommodations, Congress recognized that disabled people
"occupy an inferior status" in society. 14  Disability civil rights law,
including the duty to provide reasonable accommodations, seeks to
abolish this caste system. Another rationale for applying the reasonable
accommodation principle to disability cases is that some disabled
individuals can be productive workers if employers take measures to
diminish the effects of disabilities on workplace performance. 15 When a
reasonable accommodation removes the hampering effect of a disability,
the worker, the employer, and society benefit.
16
One may analogize disability cases to race cases. Physical and
mental impairments and unfounded stereotypes hinder the disabled from
getting jobs. Similarly, an impoverished environment, racial stereotypes,
and a contracted range of educational and employment opportunities
constrain minority workers, particularly African-Americans, from
achieving in all phases of their lives, including on the job. These
disadvantages, which might be called "societally induced racial
disabilities," hinder African-Americans in the same way that physical
and mental disabilities hinder the disabled. Members of both classes-
African-Americans and the disabled-are able to perform essential job
functions with "reasonable accommodations." In the context of racial
discrimination, a reasonable accommodation might take the form of a
traditional affirmative action plan aimed at increasing the number of
blacks in an employer's workforce, or affirmative action might take the
form of a special recruiting and training program aimed to overcome the
educational or experiential disadvantages of identified minority workers.
Although reasonable accommodation and affirmative action are not
identical, reasonable accommodation is comparable to affirmative action
in according a preference to the protected class. Both concepts assume
makes disability discrimination in employment illegal for federal executive agencies,
recipients of federal assistance, and federal contractors. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (2002).
Like the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act prescribes a duty to make reasonable
accommodations. Id. The courts have used cases decided under both acts
interchangeably for purposes of interpreting and applying this duty. Therefore, this
article will use cases decided under the Rehabilitation Act to illustrate how courts
interpret and apply the duty to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6).
15. See ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., DIsABILrTY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW 49 (1995) (noting that a principle objective of the ADA was to replace the economic
dependency of the disabled with self-sufficiency).
16. See Pamela S. Karlen & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DuKE L.J. 1, 23-24 (1996) (suggesting that hiring the
disabled results in many efficiencies, including tapping the skills of the disabled,




that the beneficiaries will perform essential job functions adequately.
Both concepts entail costs to the employer, including direct and indirect
expenses resulting from inefficiencies in the workplace. The purpose of
both concepts is to eradicate stereotypes, stigmas, and the effects of
disadvantage, whether physical, mental, or social. The scope of the
preference that reasonable accommodation affords the disabled often
equals and sometimes exceeds the scope of the preference that
affirmative action affords minorities.
Despite the bias against African-Americans that persists in our
society, Congress has not created an analogous duty to accommodate
blacks in the workplace by making some form of affirmative action
mandatory. 17  Many reasons account for Congress's inaction. First,
many in Congress oppose affirmative action on moral and practical
grounds.'8 Second, Congress must respond to popular sentiment, much
of which objects to race-conscious affirmative action.19 Many may be
more responsive to the needs of the disabled rather than the needs of
minorities, because physical disabilities are more visible than societally
induced disadvantages. Third, race is a constitutionally suspect
classification, whereas disability is not.20  Thus, any race-conscious
classification must meet the most rigorous constitutional test.
21
Of course, Congress would never create a general duty for all
17. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 100
(arguing that, like affirmative action, the basis of constitutionally mandated equal
protection is favorable treatment to blacks, rather than "colorblindness," and proposing
that the Fourteenth Amendment sometimes requires affirmative action).
18. Conservative Republicans generally oppose affirmative action. Senator Hatch,
for example, has remarked:
I say, with respect to the preferences that are a significant part of affirmative
action, two civil wrongs do not make a civil right. Affirmative action that
utilizes or encourages preferences on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender in
actual selection decisions-hiring, promotion, layoff, contract awards, school
admissions, scholarship awards, government benefits-whether labeled goal,
quota, or otherwise, is wrong and should be ended. These preferential devices
are merely another form of discrimination. I stress that preferences come in
many forms-not just quotas and not just in numerical formulations.
142 CONG. REc. S3253-01 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
19. Congressman Fields, a supporter of affirmative action, has noted: "The thing we
call affirmative action is now a racial buzz word, and people use it to divide people
instead of bringing people together, and I think that is unfortunate." 142 CONG. REC.
H6108-01 (daily ed. June 10, 1996) (statement of Rep. Fields).
20. A fourth reason is that many are more understanding of the plight of the disabled
than they are of the plight of African-Americans. An optimistic explanation for this
inclination points to the obvious hardships that people with serious disabilities bear. A
pessimistic and perhaps cynical explanation recognizes the tenacity of lingering racial
prejudice, sometimes subconscious and sometimes suppressed only by social and legal
disapprobation.




private employers to adopt affirmative action plans, and, if it did, outrage
would thunder throughout the nation. Aside from being politically
untenable, such a law would violate the guarantee of equal protection
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There is, however, a
more limited and less provocative means of mandating affirmative
action. The approach is court-ordered affirmative action. Section 706(g)
of Title VII provides that a court may "order such affirmative action as
may be appropriate,, 23 as a remedy for civil rights violations. Because
court orders are state action, court-ordered affirmative action plans must
meet not only the requirements of Title VII but also those of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the equal protection
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 4 Unlike
a global duty to engage in affirmative action, appropriate court-ordered
affirmative action does not offend the Constitution because courts
impose the duty to engage in affirmative action against only those who
have violated civil rights law.
The Supreme Court has provided guidance as to the constitutional
standard applicable to affirmative action remedies. In Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC,25 the Supreme Court
suggested that the Constitution confines such relief to egregious or
persistent violations. The Court's suggestion was wrong. All statistical
civil rights violations are serious enough to justify appropriately tailored
affirmative action. No civil rights violation is ordinary. The Court
seemed to recognize this in the Sheet Metal Workers decision by stating
that the Constitution permits court-ordered affirmative action to
eliminate "the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination, ' '26 a
requirement that arguably applies to any systemic civil rights violation.
This article argues that the primacy of the policy to eradicate racial
discrimination supports mandatory court-ordered affirmative action in
systemic racial discrimination cases. Making affirmative action
mandatory, where statistical violations are proven, would place the
policy to rid the workplace of racial discrimination on an equal footing
22. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing the constitutional constraints on affirmative
action).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2002).
24. See 5 LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 94.02, at 94-3 (2d ed.
1994) (noting that, by ordering a private party to engage in affirmative action, a court, as
a state actor, invokes constitutional scrutiny).
25. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
26. Id. at 475-76. The Court stated: "In the majority of Title VII cases, the court will
not have to impose affirmative action as a remedy for past discrimination, but need only
order the employer or union to cease engaging in discriminatory practices and award
make-whole relief to the individuals victimized by those practices." Id at 476.
Affirmative action may be necessary to combat "persistent or egregious discrimination"
or to eradicate the "lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Id.
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with the policy to rid the workplace of discrimination against the
disabled. This article proposes that the applicable constitutional
standard, the strict scrutiny test, is met even when statistical violations
fall short of "egregious or persistent." Strict scrutiny is satisfied when
the defendant violates Title VII either by engaging in a pattern and
practice of discrimination or by engaging in disparate impact
discrimination. Both violations are based on a significant disparity
between the workforce of the employer and the relevant labor market.
Affirmative action is the most effective measure to end the effects of
such violations.
Part II of this article presents Title VII's policy justifications and
legal requirements for private, voluntary affirmative action programs.
After examining the duty to provide reasonable accommodations for
individuals with disabilities, Part II compares voluntary affirmative
action to this duty. Analogizing the effects of disabilities to the effects of
racial bias, Part II argues that reasonable accommodation is essentially a
transmutation of affirmative action. Part II concludes that affirmative
action, like the duty to make reasonable accommodations, should be
mandatory under appropriate circumstances to afford African-Americans
the same level of civil rights protection provided to the disabled.
Part III proposes what the contours of court-ordered affirmative
action should be in racial discrimination cases. This part analyzes the
Supreme Court's constitutional standard for imposing affirmative action
relief. After exposing ambiguities in the Court's decisions, the author
argues that court-ordered affirmative action is a constitutional remedy for
any pattern and practice violation and any disparate impact violation.
Such a remedy must be narrowly tailored to avoid trammeling the rights
of non-minority workers or unduly injuring the violator. The author
proposes that Congress adopt this standard.
Part IV concludes that the threat of mandatory, court-imposed
affirmative action will deter racial discrimination in the workplace. To
avoid the risk of facing compulsory affirmative action, employers
engaging in intentional, systemic discrimination may abandon illegal
practices. For the same reason, those committing disparate impact
violations will comb their procedures to identify and ultimately to rid
themselves of any practice arguably subjecting them to liability.
II. The Link Between Affirmative Action and Reasonable
Accommodation
Though affirmative action and the duty to provide the disabled with
reasonable accommodations differ in some respects, the policy and legal
2003]
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contours of the two doctrines are remarkably similar.27 One may even
conclude that the duty to make reasonable accommodations for the
disabled is a form of affirmative action that often exceeds the scope of
permissible race-conscious affirmative action plans. If this is so, one
must question why some form of affirmative action is not a required
remedy in racial discrimination cases.
A. The Policy and Legal Contours ofAffirmative Action
Congress passed Title VII "to open employment opportunities for
Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them. 28
Depending on the nature of the case, Title VII affords a prevailing
plaintiff a range of remedies including declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, reinstatement and hiring of employees, back pay, other equitable
relief,2 9 attorney's fees, 30 compensatory and punitive damages, 3I and
"such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 32 Broader than relief
for individual victims of discrimination, affirmative action seeks to
provide a broad-based remedy for a protected class. It offers an
enhanced opportunity for the historically disadvantaged to overcome
obstacles to employment.
Initially, the Supreme Court had to decide whether Title VII's ban
on employment discrimination "because of race," prohibits voluntary
affirmative action.33  United Steelworkers of America v. Weber
34
27. See infra Part II.B (showing the policy and legal congruence between affirmative
action and reasonable accommodation).
28. 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Introducing the
proposed Civil Rights Act to Congress, President Kennedy explained: "There is little
value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurant if he has no
cash in his pocket and no job." 109 CONG. REc. 11159 (1963). Congress was concerned,
in 1964, not only with the history of injustices inflicted by racial discrimination, but also
with the widening gap between black and white unemployment. 110 CONG. REc. 7220
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark) ("The rate of Negro unemployment has gone up
consistently as compared with white unemployment for the past 15 years. This is a social
malaise and social situation which we should not tolerate.").
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(g)(1) (2002).
30. Id. § 2000e(k).
31. Id. § 198la(a)(1). The statute prescribes limits, based on the number of the
defendant's employees, for the amount of permissible compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. § 1981a(b)(3). Damages are not available in disparate impact cases. Id.
§ 198la(a)(1). If a defendant in a disparate treatment case proves that it would have
taken the same adverse employment action based on a non-discriminatory reason alone,
the remedies are limited to declaratory relief, attorney's fees, and injunctive or equitable
forms of relief excluding backpay, reinstatement, hiring, or promotion. Id.
§ 2000e(g)(2)(B).
32. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
33. See infra notes 344-46 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
Title VII prohibits affirmative action).
34. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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addressed this issue. In Weber, a collective bargaining agreement
seeking to reverse conspicuous racial imbalances at Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corporation established an affirmative action program to train
unskilled, incumbent minority workers for craft-worker jobs. 35 The plan
reserved fifty percent of the training slots for minorities.36
The Supreme Court held the plan permissible under Title VII,
noting that the concept of affirmative action is consistent with Title VII's
policy of eradicating racial discrimination.37 The Court observed: "It
would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over
centuries of racial injustice... constituted the first legislative prohibition
of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." 38 The Court recognized,
however, that a plan establishing rigid racial preferences would violate
Title VII.39 While declining to define with precision the requirements of
a valid affirmative action plan, the Court broadly laid out the elements.
First, a plan may seek to enlist minority employment only in traditionally
closed job categories. Second, a plan may not "unnecessarily trammel
the interests of the white workers., 40 An absolute bar to advancement,
for example, would be impermissible, but Kaiser's plan allowed fifty
percent of trainees to be white. 41 Third, a plan must be temporary, an
element which the Kaiser plan met because it provided for its termination
35. Id. at 197-98.
36. Id. at 197.
37. Id. at 209. The majority opinion baffled Chief Justice Burger. He cited section
703(d) of the Act, which forbids discrimination against a person "because of his race" in
apprenticeship and on-the-job training programs. Id. at 216-17 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Incredulous that the majority would ignore this unambiguous command, the Chief Justice
criticized the majority for basing its decision on a statutory "purpose" contrary to original
congressional intent. Id. at 217 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 204; see also H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393 ("No bill can or should lay claim to eliminating all of the
causes and consequences of racial and other types of discrimination against minorities.
There is reason to believe, however, that national leadership providedby the enactment
of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an
atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimination.").
39. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
40. Id. To dispel misconceptions about the proposed Civil Rights Act,
Representative McGregor told the House of Representatives shortly before it voted on the
bill:
People complain about.., preferential treatment or quotas in employment.
There is a mistaken belief that Congress is legislating in these areas in this bill.
When we drafted this bill we excluded these issues largely because the
problems raised by these controversial questions are more properly handled at a
governmental level closer to the American people and by communities and
individuals themselves.
110 CONG. REc. 15893 (1964) (statement of Rep. McGregor).
41. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The discharge or replacement of white workers would
also impermissibly trammel their rights. Id.
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when the percentage of skilled craft positions held by blacks at Kaiser
plants approximated the percentage of blacks in the labor force.42
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,43 the Supreme Court more
fully developed the elements of a valid affirmative action plan under
Title VII. Because women employed by the Agency were vastly
underrepresented in a number of job categories, including road
dispatcher, the Agency adopted an affirmative action plan, which
permitted sex to be considered as one factor in promotions.4 When a
road dispatcher position became available, twelve incumbent employees
applied.45 Based on interviews, the Agency deemed nine of the twelve
qualified. Johnson, a man, tied for the second highest interview rating
with a score of seventy-five, while Joyce, a woman, scored seventy-
three.46  After conducting a second interview, a board of three
supervisors recommended Johnson for the promotion. Joyce complained
that her application had not received disinterested evaluation. 47  In
response, the Agency's affirmative action coordinator recommended to
the director that Joyce get the job.48 When the director promoted her,
Johnson brought a Title VII claim.49
First, the Court considered whether the Agency's plan sought to
correct a "manifest imbalance" reflecting the underrepresentation of
women in "traditionally segregated job categories." 50  Though the
Agency cited no industry-wide statistics, the Court was satisfied with
proof of the Agency's lopsided employment figures, which showed that
no women held any of the Agency's 238 skilled craftjobs.5 1 In addition,
42. See id.
43. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
44. Id. at 620-21. The plan also sought to increase the representation of minority
employees in management, professional, and technical positions. Id. at 621.
45. Id. at 623.
46. Id. at 623-24.
47. Id. at 624.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 625. Graebner, the director, testified that in deciding in favor of Joyce he
considered a number of factors, including test scores, background, expertise, and gender,
though he saw little significance in the interview scores that had given a slight edge to
Johnson. Id. Justice Scalia attacked Graebner's assertion as self-serving. Id. at 663
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The trial record showed that Graebner did not inspect the
applications of Joyce or Johnson, and Graebner did little or nothing to inquire into the
results of the interviews, which figured so prominently in the selection process. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 631 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197
(1978)). Although the Court seemed to require a showing of traditional
underrepresentation in the job category in question, the Court was satisfied with a recital
of such underrepresentation in the Agency's affirmative action plan. Id at 634.
51. Id. at 636. General population statistics establish the relevant labor market when
the job in question is unskilled. When a job requires special training, the relevant labor
market is composed of those who possess the requisite skills. Id. at 632; see also
[Vol. 107:3
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the plan recognized the need to refine its goals continually because a low
number of qualified women might render the plan's goals unrealistic.
52
Second, the Court examined whether the plan unnecessarily
trammeled the rights of male workers.53 The Agency's plan avoided
doing so by providing flexible goals rather than quotas.54 Furthermore,
Johnson suffered no injury beyond rejection for a promotion. He
retained his current job without loss of compensation or other benefits
and he remained eligible to apply for future promotions.55 The Court
also noted that Johnson was not entitled to the road dispatcher position;
he was only one of seven qualified applicants.56
Third, the Court considered whether the plan was temporary.
Although the plan did not recite a termination date, the Court found the
omission insignificant because the continual refinement of goals
prevented the specification of an end date.57 By stating that it sought to
"attain," rather than maintain, a balanced workforce, the plan, by its
terms, was temporary and therefore satisfied the final element.5 8
If an affirmative action plan fails to meet the requirements of Weber
and Johnson, courts will reject it. In Taxman v. Board of Education,
59
the Piscataway Board of Education adopted an affirmative action plan,
which provided that, if a candidate in a protected class, such as an
African-American or woman, and another candidate not in a protected
class were equally qualified for a job, the job would go to the candidate
in the protected class.60 Statistics showed that the percentage of black
teachers that the district employed exceeded the percentage of blacks in
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (holding that the relevant
labor market for determining whether a school district had a pattern and practice of.not
hiring black teachers was the labor market of qualified teachers). Justice Scalia faulted
the Court for adopting the vague and minimal manifest-imbalance standard. Johnson,
480 U.S. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the trial court, in declaring
the plan in violation of Title VII, held that the Agency had not discriminated against
women. Id. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The plan itself, he noted, stated that the
absence of women applicants accounted for their underrepresentation in various
categories of the Agency's workforce. Id. at 660 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He decried a
plan that sought to attain a 36.4 percent representation of women in road maintenance
crews, when the vast majority of women, because of socialization, may not even want
such jobs. Id. at 668 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
52. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 635. Not establishing quotas, the plan characterized its
goals as "aspirations." Id. The goals were to take into account layoffs, turnover, new job
openings, lateral transfers, and retirements. Id.
53. Id. at 637.
54. Id. at 638.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 639-40.
58. Id. at 640.
59. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
60. Id. at 1550.
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the relevant labor force.61  Apparently recognizing this fact, the plan
stated that its purpose was not to remedy underrepresentation of blacks in
the school system, but rather was to promote equal employment
opportunity. 62 When the Board decided to reduce its teaching staff by
one, it had to choose between two teachers with equal seniority and
ability, Taxman who was white and Williams who was black.63 As the
tiebreaker, the Board invoked the affirmative action plan and elected to
discharge Taxman. 64  The Board's president defended the decision by
asserting that retaining Williams promoted cultural diversity in the
school district.65 Following Weber and Johnson, the Third Circuit found
this reason improper. The court held that a plan must seek to rectify
66underrepresentation, not to promote diversity. Moreover, the court
found the Board's plan deficient because it trammeled the rights of non-
minority employees.67 Unlike the plans in Weber and Johnson, the
Piscataway plan set no goals or benchmarks to evaluate progress, and the
harm inflicted on Taxman, loss of her job, was far more serious than
Johnson's loss of a promotion.68  Finally, rather than a temporary
measure, the plan was "an established fixture of unlimited duration. 69
61. Id. at 1551.
62. Id. at 1550.
63. Id. at 1551.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1551-52.
66. Id. at 1558. Chief Judge Sloviter, joined by Judges Lewis and McKee, dissented.
Id. at 1567 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). She argued that, although Weber and Johnson
held that an affirmative action plan may properly seek to rectify racial imbalances, those
cases did not exclude other justifications. One of the goals of Title VII, said Judge
Sloviter, is to eliminate the causes of future discrimination. Seeking cultural diversity
helps achieve this goal. Id. at 1569-71 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter
stressed that Williams was the only black teacher on the business department's faculty, so
firing her would have thwarted cultural diversity. To bolster the diversity argument,
Chief Judge Sloviter cited Supreme Court cases, including Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978), applauding racial diversity in education.
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1573 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
67. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1565.
68. Id. at 1564. The court ordered that Taxman was entitled to 100 percent back
pay. Id. at 1565. Chief Judge Sloviter disagreed with the majority's view that the board
had trammeled Taxman's rights, pointing out that, even if the Board had used a lottery to
decide between Taxman and Williams, Taxman might nevertheless have lost. Id. at 1574
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. Judge Sloviter noted that even the affirmative action plan in Johnson did not
have a specific end date. Id. at 1575 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). She read Johnson as
requiring an affirmative action plan to specify an end date only when a plan sets
numerical goals. Id. In such cases, she reasoned, an end date minimizes harm to non-
minority workers. But the Piscataway plan did not set numerical goals, so an end date
was not necessary. Id. Also, the rare invocation of the plan demonstrated the minimal
effect it had on the rights of non-minority workers. Prior to breaking the tie between




The considerations bearing on the validity of court-ordered
affirmative action differ in part from those bearing on voluntary plans.
First, a court orders an employer to adopt an affirmative action plan only
after the employer has violated civil rights law. The disparity needed to
support a violation exceeds the manifest-imbalance element of a
voluntary affirmative action plan.7° Second, the seriousness of the
violation may justify the imposition of quotas, which are forbidden in
voluntary plans. 71 Third, court-ordered affirmative action must comply
with constitutional standards because a court order constitutes state
action. 72  Nevertheless, valid court-ordered affirmative action shares
elements with valid voluntary plans. Court-ordered affirmative action,
like voluntary affirmative action, may not trammel the rights of non-
minority workers or impose a permanent obligation on the employer.73
An argument for mandatory court-ordered affirmative action derives
from the overlap between affirmative action and reasonable
accommodation. Although the two concepts appear distinct from each
other, commonalities in policy, methodology, and effect link the two
doctrines. In short, reasonable accommodation operates as a form of
affirmative action. Many of the considerations that spurred Congress to
legislate an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodations for
the disabled suggest that the courts, under appropriate circumstances,
should similarly require employers who have violated Title VII's
proscription against racial discrimination to engage in affirmative action.
70. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987). The Court distinguished
between the constitutional standard for affirmative action and the Title VII standard. The
Constitution requires an imbalance supporting a prima facie civil rights case against the
employer, while Title VII requires a statistical imbalance that does not necessarily rise to
the level of a prima facie case. Id. Requiring a prima facie case for Title VII purposes,
the Court explained, would provide a disincentive for employers to adopt affirmative
action regimes. Id. at 632-33. Justice O'Connor argued that, like the Constitution, to
support an affirmative action plan, Title VII should require a prima facie violation. Id. at
650-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She reasoned that a prima facie case does not prove a
violation, but merely demonstrates that one cannot explain the statistical imbalance by
"general societal discrimination alone." Id. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Absent a
prima facie case, Justice O'Connor believed, affirmative action would be inappropriate.
Id. at 650-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (affirming a court-
ordered affirmative action quota compelling the Alabama Department of Public Safety to
promote to the rank of corporal at least as many black troopers as white troopers,
provided a sufficient number of qualified blacks were available).
72. Id. at 153 (measuring a court-ordered affirmative action plan against the
strictures of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
73. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,479-81
(1986) (analyzing a court-ordered affirmative action plan under Title VlI's requirement
that the plan not trammel the rights of white workers and applying a similar constitutional




B. A Comparison of Reasonable Accommodation and Affirmative
Action
1. The Policy and Legal Contours of Reasonable
Accommodation
Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate rampant discrimination
affecting approximately forty-three million disabled Americans.74 The
ADA condemns discrimination against the disabled, which arises from
"unfounded stereotypes and assumptions. 75  A statute designed to
eradicate these stereotypes, the ADA recognizes that the disabled have
been subjected to "a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals.
'" 76
Integrating the disabled into the workplace benefits not only those
workers, but also employers and society at large.77 Disabled workers can
often perform job requirements capably if employers adjust workplace
conditions. To promote the employment of the disabled, the ADA
imposes a duty on employers to make reasonable accommodations for
those disabled workers who can perform essential job functions with
such accommodations. 78  Reasonable accommodations include job
restructuring, 79 modifying training or testing materials, 80 reconfiguring
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2002); see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 484-85 (1999) (holding that for purposes of being a qualified individual with a
disability people must be judged in their corrected conditions, and basing this conclusion
partly on Congress's finding that forty-three million rather than 160 million Americans
qualify for coverage under the ADA).
75. Olivares-Sifre v. P.R. Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
Barker v. Int'l Paper Co., 993 F. Supp. 10, 15 (D. Me. 1998)). The courts were referring
to the "association provision" of the ADA, which forbids discrimination in employment
based on the "known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is
known to have a relationship or association," see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), but the same
public policy concern applies to the entire Act, see id. § 12101(a)(7).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
77. Id. § 12101(a)(9) (declaring that disability discrimination "costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity").
78. Id. § 12111(9)(B).
79. See, e.g., Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research Ctr., 155 F.3d 775, 783
(6th Cir. 1998) (denying an employer summary judgment where an employee with
psoriasis sought extended leave as reasonable accommodation); Benson v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112-13 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying an employer summary
judgment where it had made no showing that a mechanic with neurological disorder
could not perform essential job functions if the job were restructured); Wilson v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172 (N.D. Ga. 1998) (denying an employer's
motion for summary judgment where an electrical and instrument mechanic with a heart
condition sought job restructuring); Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 714,
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the physical workplace, 8 acquiring or modifying furniture, tools, or
722 (D. Colo. 1995) (denying an employer summary judgment where a supervisor's duty
to conduct on-site inspections might reasonably be transferred to a co-employee); Howell
v. Michelin Tire Corp., 860 F. Supp. 1488, 1493 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (denying an employer
summary judgment against a factory worker with congenital hip condition, because
whether he was entitled to light duty presented a material issue of fact). Working at
home, an accommodation related to job restructuring, is generally considered a
"miscellaneous" accommodation, not falling within a defined category. See Langdon v.
Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 959 F.2d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (denying an
employer's motion for summary judgment where a computer worker with multiple
sclerosis sought permission to work at home full-time). Sometimes workers press for
unreasonable work-at-home accommodations. In Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department
of Administration, 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995), an administrative assistant had a spinal
condition, which caused paraplegia. Confinement to a wheelchair periodically caused
Vande Zande to develop pressure ulcers. Id. at 543. She requested permission to work at
home full-time during periods needed for the pressure ulcers to heal. The Department
allowed her to work at home and provided her with a substantial amount of work during
an eight-week absence from the office. Id. at 549. She was, however, charged with
sixteen-and-one-half hours of sick leave, because during her absence the Department fell
short of providing her with enough hours to fill eight forty-hour workweeks. Id. Vande
Zande protested. After cataloguing numerous accommodations that the Department had
made for Vande Zande's benefit, the court ruled that the Department had reasonably
accommodated her by allowing her to work at home and by providing her with as much
work as it had. Id. at 545.
80. In Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (1 1th Cir. 1983), Stutts, stricken with severe
dyslexia, could read only at the most elementary level. He applied for entry into an
apprenticeship program to become a heavy equipment operator for the Tennessee Valley
Authority. Id. at 668. TVA denied his application because he failed the standardized,
written examination. The court held that TVA had to accommodate Stutts by providing
him with an alternative examination. Id. at 669; see also Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ.,
946 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying the school board summary judgment
where a learning disabled teacher who failed the qualifying examination might be entitled
to accommodation in testing procedures, including unlimited time to complete the test).
81. E.g., Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 92-93 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Social Security Administration should have provided a distraction-free environment for
an office worker with neurological disorder); see, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 265 (1 st Cir. 1999) (denying summary judgment to an employer
where a hearing-impaired production line worker sought relocation of a loudspeaker or
acquisition of a fan as reasonable accommodations); Nieves v. Individualized Shirts, 961
F. Supp. 782, 795 (D.N.J. 1997) (denying summary judgment to an employer where a
cuff cutter with varicose veins requested the employer to reconfigure the work station).
Courts will not grant unreasonable requests for the restructuring of the workplace. See,
e.g., Conlon v. City of Long Beach, 676 F. Supp. 1289, 1295 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (denying
both parties summary judgment where a question of fact existed as to whether the
bathroom required retooling to make it accessible to an ombudsman stricken with
paralysis). In Vande Zande, Vande Zande, afflicted with a serious spinal condition,
argued that the Department should have lowered a counter in a kitchenette to enable her
to reach a sink. 44 F.3d at 545. The Department argued that it had lowered a bathroom
sink to make it accessible to her and that no further accommodation was necessary, but
Vande Zande complained that having to use the bathroom sink instead of the sink in the
kitchenette stigmatized her. Id. at 546. The court agreed with the Department, holding
that an employer has no duty to provide the disabled with facilities identical to those
provided to other employees, and that the Department met its duty by enabling Vande
Zande to work in reasonable comfort. Id
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devices,82 providing helpers such as readers or interpreters,83 modifying
work schedules, 84 reassigning disabled workers to vacant positions,85 and
making other accommodations that will enable disabled workers to
perform essential job functions.
86
Many courts have interpreted broadly the duty to make reasonable
accommodations. In Nelson v. Thornburgh,87 welfare caseworkers
employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare were
required to prepare and review paperwork. Three blind caseworkers had
been paying for readers to assist them. Asserting the right to reasonable
accommodations, the blind caseworkers argued that the Department
should bear the expense of providing readers and mechanical reading
aids.88 The court agreed, holding that such accommodations were
reasonable and did not pose an undue hardship on the Department.89
82. E.g., Wernick v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that providing ergonomic furniture to a Federal Reserve Bank manager with a back injury
was a reasonable accommodation); Perez v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 677 F. Supp. 357, 361
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that an employer had to provide a straight back chair to a
receptionist-clerk with back and leg injuries); see, e.g., Smith v. Kitterman, Inc., 897 F.
Supp. 423, 430 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (denying an employer summary judgment where an
assembly line worker with carpal tunnel syndrome created a material issue of fact that the
employer might have to provide the employee with small hand tools with large handles).
83. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing the reasonable
accommodation of providing readers for blind workers).
84. E.g., Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d 166, 172 (1st Cir. 1998) (requiring
an employer to allow a carpenter who had a mental breakdown four weeks of part-time
work); see, e.g., Failla v. City of Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1998) (upholding
jury verdict, under New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, finding that a police captain
with a back injury was entitled to transfer to the day shift); Valentine v. Am. Home
Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1399 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that an offer of part-
time employment is a reasonable accommodation).
85. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the reasonable accommodation of
reassignment).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2002). This subsection provides:
The term "reasonable accommodation" may include - (A) making existing
facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals
with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations,
training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,
and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
Id.
87. 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (addressing a case brought under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which imposes a reasonable accommodation requirement
identical to that contained in the ADA), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
88. Id.at371.
89. Id. at 380. The court noted that providing readers is specifically designated in
the regulations as a reasonable accommodation. Id. at 379; see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.12(b)(2) (1982). It also considered the cost of a part-time reader, approximately
$5000 per year, Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. at 373, in comparison to the Department's
$300,000,000 administrative budget, Id. at 380. The court concluded that the Department
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The policies justifying reasonable accommodation and affirmative
action are remarkably similar. Congress incorporated the reasonable
accommodation requirement into the ADA to stamp out a history of
discrimination that often proved more debilitating than physical or
mental disabilities themselves. Sometimes a modification in the
workplace can reduce the effects of a disability that otherwise would
prevent a person from meeting job requirements.
The effects of racial discrimination are no less debilitating than the
effects of physical and mental disabilities. Disadvantages in housing,
education, and employment, and the stigma associated with being a
second-class citizen weigh as heavily on African-Americans as did
blindness on the plaintiffs in Thornburgh.9" Both Congress and the
Supreme Court have recognized the effects of societally induced racial
disability, by establishing the legality of affirmative action as a remedy
for eradicating racial discrimination. 91  In its essential character,
affirmative action is, therefore, a form of reasonable accommodation.
Affirmative action grants preferential treatment to minority workers.
The duty of reasonable accommodation extends preferential treatment to
the disabled, by requiring employers, at their expense, to make
alterations in the workplace. This most fundamental feature of
reasonable accommodation fits within the definition of affirmative
action. 92  The duty of reasonable accommodation is arguably even
could not sustain its burden of proving undue hardship. Id.
90. See Karlen & Rutherglen, supra note 16, at 4 (comparing the effects of physical
and mental disability to the effects of the educational disadvantage of many blacks).
91. See Colin S. Diver & Jane Maslow Cohen, Genophobia: What Is Wrong with
Genetic Discrimination, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1439, 1479 (2001) (comparing the policies
underlying reasonable accommodation to the policies underlying affirmative action).
92. See Cheryl L. Anderson, "Deserving Disabilities": Why the Definition of
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act Should Be Revised To Eliminate the
Substantial Limitation Requirement, 65 Mo. L. REv. 83, 143-44 (2000) (observing that
not only do job restructuring and job reassignment "appear to be a form of affirmative
action," but that the basic concept of reasonable accommodation suggests "special
treatment or affirmative action"); Sandra R. Levitsky, Reasonably Accommodating Race:
Lessons from the ADA for Race-Targeted Affirmative Action, 18 LAW. & INEQ. 85, 106
(2000) (asserting that reasonable accommodation meets the general definition of
affirmative action because it requires the employer to provide special treatment to the
disabled by compelling the employer to accommodate the job to the needs of the disabled
employee); Stephen F. Befort & Holly Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil: Judicial
Dissonance the Supreme Court's Response, and the Future of Disability Discrimination
Law, 78 OR. L. REv. 27, 75 (1999) (calling the duty to make reasonable accommodations,
in essence, affirmative action because employers must assist employees who cannot
otherwise perform job requirements); Alex B. Long, A Good Walk Spoiled: Casey Martin
and the ADA's Reasonable Accommodation Requirement in Competitive Settings, 77 OR.
L. REv. 1337, 1343-44 (1998) (recognizing that "reasonable accommodation functions
like affirmative action" by granting the disabled special treatment); Evan Tsen Lee,
Epsteins' Premises, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 203, 217 (1994) (stating that the duty to make
reasonable accommodations requires employers to "institute an affirmative action
2003]
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broader than affirmative action because affirmative action plans, to be
consistent with Title VII, must have a predetermined endpoint. 93 By
contrast, the statutory duty of reasonable accommodation never expires.
Numerical goals limit the scope of affirmative action plans, 94 but an
employer's duty to make reasonable accommodations for the disabled
extends to any of the forty-three million who fit within the protected
class. The ADA covers any disabled applicant and any incumbent
worker who suffers from a seriousinjury or illness. Finally, affirmative
action plans must retain flexibility to adjust to changing conditions.95
The duty to make reasonable accommodations is fixed by statute.
It would therefore be incorrect to argue that accommodations for the
disabled must be reasonable, while considerations of reasonableness do
not circumscribe affirmative action "accommodations" for African-
Americans. One measures the reasonableness of the accommodation
made by an affirmative action plan by determining if it trammels the
rights of non-minority workers and if it is temporary. A plan that bars
the employment of whites or prevents the advancement of incumbent
white workers is unreasonable on its face. Similarly, a plan is improper
if devised to continue in perpetuity, even after the goal of adequate
minority representation in the workforce is met.
Both affirmative action and reasonable accommodation introduce
financial costs into the workplace. At times, the courts have taken an
expansive view of what costs an employer might reasonably have to bear
under the ADA. In Lyons v. Legal Aid Society,96 for example, the
Second Circuit reinstated a complaint alleging that Legal Aid should pay
for the parking of a staff attorney injured in a car accident.97 The
expense of reasonably accommodating the disabled can be substantial, as
was the cost of providing readers in Thornburgh.98 Affirmative action
program for the disabled").
93. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (upholding an
affirmative action plan because, among other things, it was a "temporary measure").
94. Id. at 208-09 (approving an affirmative action plan because, among other things,
the preferential selection of minorities would end when the percentage of African-
American skilled craft workers in the employer's plant approximated the percentage of
blacks in the relevant labor market).
95. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 635 (1987) (sustaining an affirmative
action plan that annually developed more refined measures of statistical imbalances in the
Agency's workforce).
96. 68 F.3d 1512 (2d Cir. 1995).
97. Id. at 1516. The court rejected Legal Aid's argument that Lyons was seeking a
"personal amenity" unrelated to essential job functions. Id. at 1517.
98. Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that the
cost of providing a half-time reader for each blind caseworker was $6638), affd, 732
F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
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similarly results in the costs of devising and administering a plan.99
Some would distinguish affirmative action from reasonable
accommodation, arguing that an employer may provide non-disabled
employees with the same accommodations that the employer must
provide to the disabled, whereas affirmative action would be defeated if
employers provided the identical preferences to minority and non-
minority employees. An "equality of preferences" would prevent a
relative increase in minority employment. 00  This distinction is
superficial. The law compels employers to accommodate only persons
with a disability. It is the scope of the legal duty that is critical, not the
reach of an employer's beneficence. In any event, employers will not
provide non-disabled employees with costly accommodations because
employers have no incentive to do so. Cost is a powerful deterrent to
benign action. The hypothetical possibility of employer largesse will not
affect a significant reordering of rights.
Another arguable distinction between the two concepts is that
affirmative action seeks to remedy the historical legacy of racial
discrimination, while the right to a reasonable accommodation applies
only to those disabled workers who actually encounter discrimination. °10
99. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
642, 698 (2001) (pointing out that both reasonable accommodations and affirmative
action involve financial expense).
100. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L.
REv. 397, 458-59 (2000) (noting policy similarities between reasonable accommodation
and affirmative action, but arguing that they differ in that an employer may extend
accommodations to all employees).
101. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 n.20 (1985) (stating that affirmative
action "is said to refer to a remedial policy for the victims of past discrimination, while
[reasonable accommodation] relates to the elimination of existing obstacles against the
handicapped"); Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1137 n.14 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing
Alexander for the proposition that affirmative action differs from reasonable
accommodation by fundamentally altering the nature of a program and by providing a
remedy for past discrimination); Mark E. Martin, Accommodating the Handicapped: The
Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 881, 885-86 (1980) (distinguishing between affirmative action, which addresses
past discrimination by granting preferences, and reasonable accommodation, which
removes barriers excluding the disabled); cf. Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117
F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997) (observing that the duty to make reasonable
accommodations differs from affirmative action in that it merely prohibits discrimination
against the disabled); Michelle A. Travis, Leveling the Playing Field or Stacking the
Deck? The "Unfair Advantage" Critique of Perceived Disability Claims, 78 N.C. L. REv.
901, 956-57 (2000) (asserting that the duty to make reasonable accommodations, unlike
affirmative action, does not require priority hiring or recruitment, but rather attempts to
eliminate discriminatory barriers facing the disabled). Ironically, the author cites
reassignment of a disabled person over a non-disabled person as an affirmative action
type remedy not available under the ADA. Id. Some courts grant such preferences to the




The argument points out that minority workers who benefit from an
affirmative action plan most likely never endured discrimination from
the employer implementing the plan. It is possible that the beneficiaries
of a plan never experienced workplace discrimination at all. Affirmative
action benefits a protected class without regard to individual
grievances.l°2 In contrast, the duty to make reasonable accommodations
is individualized,'0 3 extending only to those who need an accommodation
to perform a specific job.
The "individualized" argument has two components that must be
assessed separately: the disability-induced need of the individual, and
the appropriate remedy. As to remedy, affirmative action can be tailored
to the needs of the individual. Apprenticeship and training programs are
examples of such individualized remedies. As to the need of the
individual, all African-Americans, like the disabled, confront stereotypes
and social stigmatization. Everyone is affected, even icons like Tiger
Woods and Colin Powell. This is not to say that no African-Americans
have acquired top-tier college educations or have landed upper
management positions at Fortune 500 companies. It is merely to say that
stereotypes follow every African-American regardless of his or her
success.10 4 African-American workers, at this point in history, should
not have to prove societally induced racial disability. Facts supporting
such a claim, unlike those supporting a claim of physical or mental
disability, are always elusive and often not provable. Until our culture
102. See Bagenstos, supra note 100, at 459.
103. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (directing the district court, on
remand, "to conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate findings of fact" to
determine if Arline was otherwise qualified for the job of elementary school teacher);
Hall v. United States Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073, 1079 (6th Cir. 1988) (reversing a grant
of summary judgment for the employer and directing the district court to make an
individualized inquiry into whether Hall could perform essential job functions of
distribution postal clerk and whether the Postal Service could reasonably accommodate
her); Richard B. Simring, Note, The Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws on
Housing for People with Mental Disabilities, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 413, 428-29 (1991)
(pointing out that the duty to accommodate reasonably the disabled requires an
individualized assessment).
104. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). "It is unnecessary
in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been
victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that
none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to'escape its impact." Id. at 400
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One commentator argues that
race should not be a proxy for injury. John Marquez Lundin, The Call for a Color-Blind
Law, 30 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 407, 446-47 (1997). He points out that a newly
arrived Nigerian immigrant has not suffered discrimination in the United States. Using
race as a proxy for injury, he argues, ignores socio-economic variability: the country has
wealthy, highly educated blacks and poor, uneducated whites. It may be assumed,
however, that any black person who has spent any period of time in this country has
encountered stigmas and stereotypes that few, if any, other people endure.
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achieves some semblance of racial equality, one may assume the
pervasiveness of this social condition.
Although it may be true that a particular beneficiary of an
affirmative action plan never suffered discrimination at the hands of the
employer implementing the plan, the same point applies to the
beneficiary of a reasonable accommodation. An employer must
reasonably accommodate a disabled person, even though the employer
has not discriminated against that person. The employer may wish to
avoid the costs of a reasonable accommodation, but the motive to cut
expenses is not the motive to discriminate. Providing many
accommodations currently required by law, such as reconfiguration of
the workplace, helpers, and preferential reassignment, probably did not
occur to many employers before the ADA was adopted, and many
disabled workers probably never thought to request such
accommodations. It would be unfair to characterize an employer's
reluctance to provide such accommodations as evidencing discriminatory
intent even in a subtle or unconscious sense. Such accommodations are
extraordinary remedial measures meant to combat a pervasive social ill.
If not providing an accommodation ultimately ruled reasonable by a
court is proof of discrimination, then every time an employer chooses to
hire a qualified white worker rather than a qualified black worker the
employer must be guilty of racial bias. Condemnation is unjustified in
either case.
A related argument attempting to distinguish reasonable
accommodation from affirmative action is that the duty to make
reasonable accommodations flows from the principle of fostering
equality rather than from the model of providing preferential
treatment. 0 5 This argument asserts that equal treatment of disabled
workers requires special adjustments in the workplace. 0 6 To hold the
105. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 14 (1987) (stating that a building that is not
wheelchair accessible reflects the dominant societal perspective rather than a neutral
one); Collette G. Matzzie, Note, Substantive Equality and Antidiscrimination:
Accommodating Pregnancy Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 82 GEO. L.J. 193,
197 (1993) (arguing that workplace barriers to disabled employees violate the principle of
equality).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2002). This subsection provides that for
purposes of the ADA the term "discrimination" includes "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity." Id The EEOC has stated:
Reasonable accommodation is a key nondiscrimination requirement of the
ADA because of the special nature of discrimination faced by people with
disabilities. Many people with disabilities can perform jobs without any need
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disabled to the same working conditions as the non-disabled, the
argument asserts, is to discriminate; the simple removal of barriers
allows disabled people to perform jobs satisfactorily. Not making
reasonable accommodations is disability discrimination in the same way
that not providing additional sick leave to a pregnant woman can be
viewed as sex discrimination. 10 7  Sometimes the only way to achieve
equal treatment is to take differences into account. Affirmative action,
the argument continues, may award a minority applicant a position,
although a non-minority applicant has superior credentials. In Hopwood
v. Texas, 10 8 for example, Cheryl Hopwood applied for and was denied
admission to the University of Texas School of Law. She had an
undergraduate GPA of 3.8; the average GPA of minority students
admitted under the law school's affirmative action program was 3.3.109
One might have predicted that Hopwood would have been more
successful in law school than some of the minority students admitted.10
Some argue therefore that, unlike reasonable accommodation,
for accommodations. But many others are excluded from jobs they are
qualified to perform because of unnecessary barriers in the workplace and the
work environment. The ADA recognizes that such barriers may discriminate
against qualified people with disabilities just as much as overt exclusionary
practices.
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT § 3.2, at 111-1 to -2 (1992); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 26.3.3, at 39 (describing the failure to accommodate the disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act as disparate treatment, that is, intentional discrimination). But see 1
LARSON, supra note 24, § 1.09[1], at 1-58 (noting that "this requirement [reasonable
accommodation] is not one of nondiscrimination but rather of mandated preferential
treatment").
107. See Matzzie, supra note 105, at 223 (contending that pregnancy should be
recognized as an ADA disability thereby requiring employers to make reasonable
accommodations for pregnant women).
108. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at 937-38.
110. One commentator contends that affirmative action may result in jobs going to
minority workers less qualified than their white counterparts. Mark C. Weber, Beyond
the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Employment Policy for People with
Disabilities, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 123, 149 (1998). Reasonable accommodation, he argues,
requires the disabled worker to be the most highly qualified for the job. Id This
argument fails for two reasons. First, it does not take into account the inefficiencies that
accompany reasonable accommodations. For example, inefficiency results from
providing helpers, retraining for reassignments, permitting a person to work at home, or
enabling a worker to take rest periods. Second, black workers who, because of
affirmative action, get the benefit of their race as a "plus" factor are, at least arguably,
just as qualified as their competitors. One of the purposes of affirmative action is to
remove arbitrary selection criteria that unfairly exclude blacks. See Duncan Kennedy, A
Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705,
715 (1990) (arguing that traditional hiring standards tend to exclude blacks from law
school professorships resulting in the loss of unique contributions).
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affirmative action lowers standards."'
The first response to the equality argument rejects the premise that
reasonable accommodations assure equality, and argues that reasonable
accommodations do grant preferences. The proof of this assertion is that
reasonable accommodations result in inefficiencies in job performance.
In Thornburgh, the time needed to process a welfare application
unquestionably increased because Thornburgh needed to interact with a
reader to identify relevant information.'"2 Although it is theoretically not
a reasonable accommodation to hire disabled workers less qualified than
other job candidates, such accommodations often result in diminished
performance.
It is doubtful that affirmative action lowers performance standards
any more than reasonable accommodations do. Rather than granting a
"preference" to an unqualified African-American worker, affirmative
action removes cultural and educational barriers, which is another way of
saying "disabilities." Like the duty to make reasonable accommodations,
affirmative action does not require hiring a worker who cannot perform
essential job functions." 3 Hiring unqualified blacks would, under Weber
and Johnson, trammel the rights of qualified whites and render a plan in
violation of Title VII. The "lower standards" argument also ignores that
the selection criteria for many jobs-interviews, tests, and educational
credentials-create obstacles for blacks just as a staircase without a ramp
creates an obstacle for a person confined to a wheelchair. The
underlying assumption of affirmative action, much like reasonable
accommodation, is that some blacks, although ostensibly not as qualified
as some whites for a particular job if traditional qualification measures
are used, are in fact just as qualified if given a chance to perform." 4
111. See Donald J. Olenick, Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section
504 After Southeastern, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 171, 185-86 (1980) (arguing that affirmative
action entails compromising standards, whereas reasonable accommodation does not).
112. See Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), ajfd, 732 F.2d 146
(3d Cir. 1984).
113. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987) (approving the
Agency's affirmative action plan, which "merely authorize[d] that consideration be given
to affirmative action concerns when evaluating [a] qualified applicant") (emphasis
added); see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 378 (1978) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("There is no sensible, and certainly no
constitutional distinction between, for example, adding a set number of points to the
admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an expression of the preference
with the expectation that this will result in the admission of an approximately determined
number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for such
applicants as was done here.") (emphasis added).
114. See Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers to Employment: The
Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1431 (1991) (comparing and contrasting
reasonable accommodation and affirmative action).
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Interviews can hide bias, blatant or subtle, and test questions and
educational credentials often reward the experience of having lived
among the white middle-class. 15 None of these evaluation techniques
necessarily predicts job performance accurately. Removing these
barriers enables African-Americans to show that they are as qualified as
their white counterparts.
Some would challenge this argument. But, even if one concludes
that affirmative action does grant preferences, one cannot reasonably
deny that the same is true of reasonable accommodation. Preferential
treatment of the disabled is most striking when workers seek the
reasonable accommodation of reassignment.
2. Reassignment: A "Special" Accommodation
The ADA requires that disabled workers who cannot perform the
essential functions of their current jobs must be offered an entirely
different position, if vacant, as long as they can perform its essential job
functions." 6  The duty to reassign obligates employers to take
affirmative action to find a new job, if vacant, for disabled incumbent
employees who cannot perform the essential functions of their current
jobs. 117
In Gile v. United Air Lines, Inc.,118 Gile worked on the night shift as
a data-entry operator for United Air Lines. Late working hours caused
Gile to experience worsening insomnia and anxiety, symptoms which led
her to see a social worker. 119 After the social worker diagnosed Gile's
condition as a "depressive reaction,"' 12 0 Gile requested that United
reassign her to a day job, expressing her willingness to do work other
than data entry. United argued that the duty to accommodate a disabled
115. See Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing,
104 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 1220 (1991) (questioning the validity of aptitude tests, which
measure problem solving in situations irrelevant to job performance).
116. The Supreme Court, in School Board v. Arline, calling the duty to accommodate
reasonably employees an "affirmative obligation," stated that, "although employers are
not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she
was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities
reasonably available under the employer's existing policies." 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19
(1987).
117. See Stephen F. Befort & Tracey H. Donesky, Reassignment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Reasonable Accommodation, Affirmative Action, or
Both? 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1045, 1082 (2000) (observing that the reasonable
accommodation of reassignment resembles affirmative action in that reassignment
provides the disabled worker with preferential treatment, but concluding that the two
terms should not be equated).
118. 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1996).




employee by reassignment did not include transfer to a different job
category. 12' The court disagreed. 122 Reversing the district court's order
of summary judgment for United, the Seventh Circuit held: "[T]he ADA
may require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a different
position as reasonable accommodation where the employee can no
longer perform the essential job functions of their [sic] current
position."
123
Reassigning Gile to a different position would inevitably require
retraining. If, for example, Gile were transferred to a reservation
position, she would have to learn how to operate a workstation computer.
If she were transferred to a clerical position, she would have to learn how
to prepare necessary paperwork. Retraining someone for a new job is
affirmative action.
121. Id. at 496.
122. Id. at 498. The court relied partly on a Rehabilitation Act EEOC guidance,
which states: "An employer may assign an employee to a lower graded position if there
are no accommodations that would enable the employee to remain in the current position
and there are no vacant equivalent positions for which the individual is qualified with or
without a reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) app. (2001). The court
also looked to legislative history of the ADA, which states:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a vacant
position. If an employee, because of his disability, can no longer perform the
essential functions of the job that she or he has held, a transfer to another
vacant job for which the person is qualified may prevent the employee from
being out of work and the employer from losing a valuable worker.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 267 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303. Caselaw
also supported the court's conclusion. E.g., Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d
1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a mechanic suffering from a neurological
disorder may be entitled to reassignment to the company's recycling unit); Vasquez v.
Besole, 888 F. Supp. 727, 731 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (reversing an order of summary judgment
against a deputy sheriff stricken with epilepsy, who showed she was capable of working
in deputy sheriff positions that did not require her to carry firearms, make arrests, or drive
a vehicle); see, e.g., Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 832 (3d Cir. 1996) (instructing that
a mail carrier with a disabling foot condition would have been entitled to reassignment to
a clerical position if he had shown that he was qualified for the position and that the
position was vacant and of equivalent level to a mail carrier position). But see Myers v.
Rose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that an employer is not obliged to offer a
disabled employee "alternative employment").
123. Gile, 95 F.3d at 498. The court qualified this holding in two respects. It noted
that the duty to reassign does not arise if the employer offers the employee another
reasonable accommodation, and that the duty to reassign applies only to an existing,
vacant position for which the employee can perform essential job functions. Id. at 499;
see also Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing
that reassignment is a reasonable accommodation, but holding that the plaintiff did not
identify a suitable position for reassignment); cf. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90
F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that an employer was not required to put an
injured employee on leave for an indefinite period until a vacant position opened); United
States v. City & County of Denver, 943 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D. Colo. 1996) (rejecting
argument that defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the City had no
policy to transfer officers from active duty positions to non-police jobs on the payroll).
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Some cases draw an even closer parallel between reasonable
accommodation and affirmative action, requiring an employer to grant a
preference to a disabled employee over more qualified employees who
seek the same reassignment. In Aka v. Washington Hospital Center,'
24
the job responsibilities of Aka, a hospital orderly, involved heavy lifting.
Because of a heart condition, he sought transfers to less strenuous
positions.125 As in Gile, the hospital argued that its duty to accommodate
Aka did not extend to reassignment to a new job category. 26 Rejecting
this argument, the court quoted the ADA, which defines a qualified
individual with a disability as someone who "with or without a
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential job functions of
the employment position that such individual holds or desires."'27 The
court went even further, concluding that the ADA gives incumbent
disabled employees 128 a preference for reassignment to vacant jobs.
12 9
The court noted that the House report on the ADA explained that the
124. 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
125. Id. at 1287.
126. Id. at 1300.
127. Id. at 1301 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1997)).
128. Id. at 1304. The court noted that legislative history warns against preferences for
applicants, but found that admonition inapplicable to incumbent employees, to whom the
same report implicitly grants preferences. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303.
129. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304. The court inferred an affirmative rather than a passive
obligation from the Act's use of the word "reassign." Id.; see also Smith v. Midland
Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the right of
reassignment of an assembly line worker with chronic dermatitis affords him a preference
over other workers qualified for the position); John E. Murray & Christopher J. Murray,
Enabling the Disabled: Reassignment and the ADA, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 721, 742 (2000)
(advocating preferential reassignment of the disabled over more qualified non-disabled
employees). The EEOC takes the position that qualified disabled employees are entitled
to a preference for reassignment to vacant positions over more qualified employees. The
EEOC enforcement guidance provides: "The employee does not have to be the best
qualified individual for the position in order to obtain it as a reassignment." United State
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, No.
915.002, EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) 6908, at 5453-56 (Mar. 1, 1999). The
enforcement guidance also provides: "29. Does reassignment mean that the employee is
permitted to compete for a vacant position? No. Reassignment means that the employee
gets the position if s/he is qualified for it." Id (emphasis in original). But see EEOC v.
Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 2000) (denying a disabled
warehouse picker reassignment to other positions where other workers competing for
those positions were more qualified than the disabled worker); Daniel B. Frier, Age
Discrimination and the ADA: How the ADA May Be Used To Arm Older Americans
Against Age Discrimination by Employers Who Would Otherwise Escape Liability Under
the ADEA, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 173, 190 (1993) (asserting that the ADA was not intended
to be an affirmative action statute granting the disabled preference for reassignment over
more qualified non-disabled workers); but see also Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
117 F.3d 800, 808 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that an expeditor with a pacemaker was not
entitled to a preference for a new position over other qualified employees).
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duty to reassign does not require "bumping" an incumbent employee out
of a job. 130 The committee's remark would have been unnecessary, the
court observed, if the ADA did not contemplate giving the disabled
employee a preference. 131 Similarly, the court pointed out that the report
states: "[I]f a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for
employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a
factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign
an employee with a disability without seniority to the job."' 132  This
committee report comment suggests that the right to the reasonable
accommodation of reassignment may trump even those rights afforded a
union member protected under a collective bargaining agreement. 133
130. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304. The House report states: "The Committee also wishes to
make clear that reassignment need only be to a vacant position-'bumping' an employee
out of a position to create a vacancy is not required." H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345.
131. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
132. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345). Most courts hold that the ADA right to reassignment is
subordinate to rights conferred by a collective bargaining agreement. Aldrich v. Boeing
Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998) (denying an assembly worker with a
tendon condition reassignment to maintenance oiler or other positions because such
reassignments would have violated a collective bargaining agreement); Feliciano v.
Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 787 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the reassignment of a
mental health facility attendant with lower-back injury to the clerical ward aide position
was not required in light of a collective bargaining agreement); Eckles v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the claim of a yardmaster with
epilepsy to a less taxing job, because of the seniority system established by a collective
bargaining agreement); see Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1306-07
(11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that a lineman working for a power company was not entitled to
light duty where a collective bargaining agreement established a seniority system for
overtime); Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (ruling that a toll collector
with a back injury was not entitled to relief from forced overtime when such
accommodation violated a collective bargaining agreement). But see Woodman v.
Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1346-47 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that, under the heightened
standard applying to a federal employer, where a collective bargaining agreement does
not expressly bar reassignment, such an agreement does not entitle a defendant to
summary judgment); Estella J. Shoen, Does the ADA Make Exceptions in a Unionized
Workplace? The Conflict Between the Reassignment Provisions of the ADA and
Collective Bargaining Seniority Systems, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1391, 1420 (1998) (arguing
that, when collective bargaining seniority rights conflict with the ADA right to
reassignment, the court should engage in a fact-specific inquiry to determine priority
rather than relying on a per se rule favoring the collective bargaining agreement because
the ADA right to reassignment operates like an insurance policy protecting any
incumbent worker who becomes disabled).
133. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304. Judge Henderson, writing for four dissenters, agreed
with the majority that under appropriate circumstances reassignment is a required
reasonable accommodation. Id. at 1306, 1310 (Henderson, J, dissenting). She disagreed,
however, with the proposition that disabled employees are entitled to a preference. Id. at
1311 (Henderson, J., dissenting). To bolster her view, Judge Henderson quoted the
House report, which states: "[T]he employer has no obligation under this legislation to
prefer applicants with disabilities over other applicants on the basis of disability." Id.
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According to the report, even national labor policy may be subordinate to
the ADA right of preferential reassignment.'
34
The Supreme Court, however, has recently held that, absent special
circumstances, a well-established seniority system supersedes a disabled
worker's right to reassignment.
135 In U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,
136
Barnett injured his back while working as a cargo-handler for U.S.
Airways. At Barnett's request, U.S. Airways transferred him to a less
strenuous mailroom position. 137  Invoking the company's seniority
system, two employees bid for Barnett's new job. 138 Barnett asked the
company to accommodate his disability by granting him an exception
from the seniority system. After considering Barnett's request for five
months, the company denied the request.
139
The Ninth Circuit held that the conflict between Barnett's ADA
rights and the seniority system demanded a fact-specific inquiry. 40 On
appeal, the Supreme Court took a somewhat different view. It pointed
out that, although "preferences"' 4' and even "affirmative conduct"'' 42 are
sometimes necessary to achieve the goals of the ADA, where a well-
established seniority system is in place and workers have come to rely on
its evenhanded application, the right of a disabled worker to
reassignment bows to the seniority system, unless the disabled worker
shows special circumstances. 143  The Court went on to explain what
(citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11) (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303). She also
cited supporting caselaw. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.
1995) ("We do not read the ADA as requiring affirmative action in favor of individuals
with disabilities, in the sense of requiring that disabled persons be given priority in hiring
in reassignment over those who are not disabled.").
134. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516, 1524-25 (2002) (casting doubt on
the vitality of Congress's balancing of reassignment rights stemming from the ADA and
from a collective bargaining agreement).
135. See EEOC v. Sara Lee Corp. 237 F.3d 349, 354 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
thirty-year-old seniority system applying to interplant transfers defeats the right of a
disabled worker to reassignment).
136. 122 S. Ct. 1516.
137. Id at 1519.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated
and remanded, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002). Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit held that the
reassignment was a reasonable accommodation and that even a seniority system was not
a per se bar to reassignment of a person with a disability. Id. at 1120. Accordingly, the
court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of U.S. Air and
remanded the case. Id. at 1122.
141. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516.
142. Id. at 1523.
143. Id. at 1524-25. The Court reasoned:
[T]o require the typical employer to show more than the existence of a seniority
system might well undermine the employees' expectations of consistent,
uniform treatment - expectations upon which the seniority system's benefits
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"special circumstances" it contemplated. If, for example, the seniority
system already contained exceptions, the reasonable expectations of
workers would not likely be frustrated by a further exception for a
disabled worker. 14 4 Or, if the employer reserved the right to change the
seniority system and "fairly frequently" exercised that power, it would be
permissible to depart from the seniority system to protect a disabled
employee. 45 The Court remanded the case to provide Barnett with the
opportunity to prove special circumstances.
146
Although the Court established an outer limit for the right to
reassignment, the Court also created an escape route that plaintiffs will
undoubtedly -test. The preference afforded disabled workers who seek
reassignment exceeds the preference accorded minority workers hired or
promoted through affirmative action. To meet Title VII requirements, an
affirmative action plan may consider race as only one factor in the
selection process, but race may not operate as the only or decisive
factor.-4 Under the ADA, however, disability sometimes operates as the
depend. That is because such a rule would substitute a complex case-specific
"accommodation" decision made by management for the more uniform,
impersonal operation of seniority rules. Such management decision making,
with its inevitable discretionary elements, would involve a matter of the
greatest importance to employees, namely, layoffs ....
Id.
144. Id. at 1525.
145. Id.
146. Id. Justice O'Connor concurred. Id. at 1526 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She
pointed out that the ADA requires reassignment only to a "vacant" position. If a seniority
system gives a worker a legally enforceable right to fill a job, then the job is not vacant.
Since U.S. Airways conceded that its seniority system did not create legally enforceable
rights, Justice O'Connor would have held in favor of Barnett. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Nonetheless, believing that her standard would usually lead to the same
result as the majority view (which would have been a plurality without her vote), and
wanting the Court to have a five-judge majority, she concurred. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Thomas joined.
Id. at 1528 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that the ADA bans discrimination against
the disabled "because of the disabilities" of such individuals, and that the ADA requires
employers to make reasonable accommodations to the known disabilities of workers. Id.
at 1529 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Reading these two provisions together, he concluded that
employers must modify the practices that burden the disabled because of their
disabilities. Since a seniority system weights equally on all workers, whether disabled or
not, such a system does not burden individuals because of their disabilities. Thus, the
ADA should never defeat a seniority system. Id. at 1528-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter also dissented, but he took the opposite view.
Id. at 1532 (Souter, J., dissenting). He invoked legislative history, stating that a seniority
system under a collective bargaining agreement is merely a "factor" to be considered
when determining the propriety of reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. Since
the vigorous policy favoring collective bargaining agreements does not operate in favor
of other management-created seniority systems, such systems should not be considered
even as factors. Id. at 1533-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
147. In Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court
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decisive factor. Unless the employer has established a seniority system
without loopholes or exceptions, the reassignment of a qualified disabled
worker gets priority over a qualified non-disabled worker with more
seniority.
3. The Undue Hardship Defense
The nature of the undue hardship defense in disability
discrimination cases shows that the duty to make reasonable
accommodations for the disabled may place extraordinary demands on
employers. Such demands amount to a form of affirmative action. Once
the plaintiff identifies a reasonable accommodation, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove that the accommodation would cause an undue
hardship. 48  The standard of "undue hardship" implies that the ADA
held the race-conscious affirmative action program of the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis unlawful. Justice Powell wrote:
In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed a
"plus" in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not insulate the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats. The file of a
particular black applicant may be examined for his potential contribution to
diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared, for
example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter
is thought to exhibit qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational
pluralism.
Id. at 317; see Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (upholding, by
a five-to-four majority, University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action
admissions policy based in part on promoting diversity among the student body), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 821
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (upholding similar admissions policy of University of Michigan's
undergraduate school), cert. granted before judgment, 123 S. Ct. 602 (2002). But see
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the University of Georgia's use of diversity as a decisive admissions
criterion was not narrowly tailored and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause,
without deciding whether diversity is a compelling state interest that would justify racial
preferences).
148. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1186-87 (6th Cir. 1996). In
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration, 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir.
1995), Judge Posner offered an explanation for distinguishing between reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship. He suggested that an accommodation is reasonable
if it is efficacious and if the benefit is proportional to the cost. Even if the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing that a reasonable accommodation would enable her to perform the
job, the employer may show undue hardship, which means that the costs are excessive in
relation to the benefits or to the employer's financial health or survival. Id. at 543. This
view interprets reasonable accommodation as relating primarily to proportionality of cost
to benefits and undue hardship as relating primarily to harm caused to the employer. The
employee bears the initial burden of proving efficaciousness and proportionality of costs
and benefits of the accommodation, and the employer bears the burden of proving the
harm it would suffer were the court to compel it to make the accommodation. Sometimes
courts merge the two concepts. In Borkowski v. Valley Central School District, 63 F.3d
131 (2d Cir. 1995), Borkowski suffered permanent neurological injury from a traffic
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foresees some permissible level of "hardship" on the employer., 49 An
undue hardship arises when the accommodation threatens the employer
with financial harm or with disruption of its operations.'5" In other
accident. After three years of working as a probationary library teacher for the school
board, the board denied her tenure because she had difficulty controlling her students. Id.
at 134. She argued that she was entitled to a teacher's aide as a reasonable
accommodation. Id. at 133-34. The court held that, since ADA regulations contemplate
accommodations such as aides and assistants, Borkowski met her burden of production.
Id. at 142. The burden then shifted to the board to show either that the cost of providing
an aide would outweigh the benefits, or that the financial impact of providing an aide
would be unreasonable or unduly burdensome. Id. at 142-43. Since the school board had
not established either that the accommodation would be unreasonable or that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship, the court reversed summary judgment
for the board and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 143-44.
149. See WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT LAW IS
PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 107 (1997) (arguing that the ADA saddles
employers with some level of hardship, which implies a form of affirmative action for the
disabled). The EEOC defines undue hardship as follows:
Undue hardship means, with respect to the provision of an accommodation,
significant difficulty or expense incurred by a covered entity, when considered
in light of the factors set forth in paragraph (p)(2) of this section .... (2)
Factors to be considered. In determining whether an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include:
(i) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed under this part, taking
into consideration the availability of tax credits and deductions, and/or outside
funding; (ii) The overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved
in the provision of the reasonable accommodation, the number of persons
employed at such facility, and the effect on expenses and resources; (iii) The
overall financial resources of the covered entity, the overall size of the business
of the covered entity with respect to the number of its employees, and the
number, type and location of its facilities; (iv) The type of operation or
operations of the covered entity, including the composition, structure and
functions of the workforce of such entity, and the geographic separateness and
administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the
covered entity; and (v) The impact of the accommodation upon the operation of
the facility, including the impact on the ability of other employees to perform
their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct business.
EEOC Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2001); see, e.g., Johnson v. Brown, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 147, 152 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding a material issue of fact, under a heightened
standard for the federal government to accommodate the disabled, as to whether
reassigning a hospital janitor permanently to light duty is an undue hardship since other
employees received similar transfers); Kacher v. Houston Comm. College Sys., 974 F.
Supp. 615, 621-22 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (denying the college summary judgment because
there was a question of fact as to whether limiting or eliminating a radiology instructor's
teaching responsibilities to teach clinical classes imposed undue hardship on the college).
150. The ADA provides the following definition of undue hardship:
(A) The term "undue hardship" means an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph
(B) .... (B) In determining whether an accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include - (i) the
nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; (ii) the overall
financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of the
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words, the undue hardship defense ensures that the disabled receive
preferential treatment. In Thornburgh the yearly cost of hiring a part-
time reader was $6638 for each of the three plaintiffs.' 51 The court
rejected the argument that this accommodation created an undue
hardship because the cost did not threaten the financial stability of the
Department of Public Welfare.1 52 The cost to Pennsylvania, however, is
much greater than the $20,000 needed to provide readers for the three
plaintiffs because other blind employees on the payroll of any unit of
state government will likely demand the same accommodation.
Courts have sustained accommodations that arguably disrupted
workplace operations. In Dutton v. Board of County Commissioners,'
53
an equipment operator working for Johnson County had severe migraine
headaches. He wanted to supplement his sick leave with accrued
vacation time to increase the number of work days he could miss when
his condition flared up. 154  The County refused to make this
accommodation because vacation time required advance scheduling,
whereas employees took sick leave unpredictably. 1 55 The court affirmed
the jury's verdict that such an accommodation was reasonable and that
the County failed to prove undue hardship. 1
56
The duty to make reasonable accommodations is ongoing. Even
when an employer makes a series of good faith accommodations, if the
accommodations ultimately fail, the courts may require the employer to
reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility;
the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such
accommodation upon the operation of the facility; (iii) the overall financial
resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business of a covered
entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and the type of operation or operations of the covered
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of
such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship
of the facility or facilities in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(10) (2002).
151. 567 F. Supp. 369, 376 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 380 (finding that the expense of hiring three half-time readers was modest
compared to the Department's $300,000,000 annual budget). The court found other
proposed accommodations acceptable, such as providing each blind worker with a
Versabraille, a portable computer aid, which cost $7000. This accommodation, which
would have reduced but not eliminated the need for readers, would have required the
purchase of printers at $700 each, and the purchase of maintenance contracts at $700
each. Id. at 375.
153. 868 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D. Kan. 1994).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1264. The County had discharged the plaintiff. The court ordered the
County to reinstate him and to provide the accommodation of supplementing sick leave
with accrued vacation time. Id. at 1265.
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do more. In Kent v. Derwinski,157 a Veterans Administration Medical
Center (VAMC) hired Kent, who was mentally retarded and
schizophrenic, to work in the laundry facility. The court labeled hiring
Kent as a reasonable accommodation, but employing her could just as
accurately have been called affirmative action. Using profanity,
mumbling, and having emotional outbursts characterized her
disability.158 Some of her co-workers taunted her, which exacerbated her
symptoms. 59 In response, management required Kent's co-workers to
attend two sensitivity training sessions, and trained and counseled Kent's
supervisor, who was sometimes hypercritical of Kent. 160 Management
also provided Kent with extensive counseling on how to improve her
interpersonal skills. 16' All these efforts failed to relieve Kent's work-
related problems. The court ordered VAMC to implement additional
follow-up measures. 162 To require so much accommodative action of an
employer blurs the distinction between reasonable accommodation and
affirmative action.
Disabled employees, however, are not entitled to any
accommodation they seek. In Barth v. Gelb,163 for example, Barth, a
Washington-based computer specialist employed by the Voice of
America (VOA), sought a transfer to an overseas radio relay station.
Afflicted with degenerative diabetes, Barth failed the medical clearance
examination for transfer because he required the services of medical
facilities not available at many of the VOA's remote overseas
locations.' 64  Barth argued that his reassignment was a reasonable
accommodation. VOA asserted that only three or four of the twelve
overseas locations had medical facilities adequate to meet Barth's needs,
an assertion which Barth did not challenge.165 Because VOA showed
that its operations required the frequent transfer of personnel from one
overseas location to another, the court sustained the VOA's claim that
granting Barth his desired reassignment would pose an undue hardship
on VOA.
166
The point is not to challenge the breadth of the ADA's duty to make
157. 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1034 (E.D. Wash. 1991).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1037.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1040. Kent's previous supervisor, Smith, had been far more sensitive to
her needs than her subsequent supervisor, Randall, who was not only critical of Kent but
also took no action to quell the taunting by co-workers. Id.
163. 2 F.3d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 1182.
165. Id. at 1188.
166. Id. at 1188-89.
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reasonable accommodations or to lament the level of hardship that an
employer must accept. Compelling policies support a generous
interpretation of the ADA's remedial provisions. Rather, the point is that
undue hardship cases raise a perplexing issue. The ADA duty to make
reasonable accommodations guarantees the disabled a wide berth of
protection. Race-based affirmative action is analogous in nature and
scope to this duty. Affirmative action, however, is principally a
voluntary remedy. 67 The issue is why minorities receive less protection
than the disabled.
4. Pronouncements of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has commented, sometimes confusingly, on the
analogy between reasonable accommodation and affirmative action. In
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,'68 the Court declared that the policies of the
ADA "will sometimes require affirmative conduct to promote entry of
disabled people into the workforce." ' 69 One cannot easily differentiate
between "affirmative action" and "affirmative conduct" as the Court
used that term. Yet, over two decades ago in Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,170 the Supreme Court distinguished the duty to make
reasonable accommodations for the disabled from the regulatory
obligation of recipients of federal funds to provide prescribed forms of
affirmative action to the disabled. This distinction, however, does not
detract from the force of the analogy between reasonable accommodation
and race-conscious affirmative action. Davis had a serious hearing
impairment, and the college denied her admission into its nursing
program because of the disability. Davis argued that the college had the
duty to undertake "affirmative action" to accommodate her needs. 7 1 She
167. Although the disabled receive the benefit of the employer's broad duty to make
reasonable accommodations, courts, particularly the Supreme Court, have not been as
generous in defining the scope of the protected class of disabled individuals. See Toyota
v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (holding that a showing of carpal tunnel syndrome that
impeded plaintiff's ability to perform manual tasks at work did not, without more, prove
a substantial limitation of the major life activity of being able to perform manual tasks);
see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (holding that, to
determine whether vision-impaired plaintiffs were disabled individuals within the
meaning of the ADA, they had to be judged in their corrected condition, that is, the
analysis had to take into account whether their vision was correctable with glasses). But
see Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 637-39 (1998) (holding that under the ADA
asymptomatic HIV is an impairment, that reproduction is a major life activity, and that a
person with asymptomatic HIV is substantially limited in the major life activity of
reproduction).
168. 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002).
169. Id. at 1523.




asked for individual supervision when attending to patients and requested
that the college dispense with requiring her to take clinical courses in the
nursing curriculum. 172 The Court held merely that the college was not
required to provide "affirmative action" to enable Davis to participate in
the program because providing her with individual supervision would
constitute a hardship on the college. 173 Moreover, waiving all clinical
requirements would simply not prepare her to be a nurse.'74 The Davis
Court, as a shorthand method of rejecting Davis's unrealistic demands,
stated that she was not entitled to "affirmative action.'
75
Several years after Davis, the Supreme Court, in Alexander v.
Choate,176 apologized for confusion the Davis opinion had caused over
the meanings of affirmative action and reasonable accommodation.
77
Without analysis, the Court stated, in a footnote, that affirmative action
"is said to refer to a remedial policy for the victims of past
discrimination," whereas reasonable accommodation refers to
"elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped.' 78 Dusting
off this stock distinction did not illuminate the meanings of these terms.
Nor did it undermine the analogy between them. The duty to make
reasonable accommodations is broadly remedial. Not merely concerned
with the individual, this duty seeks to eliminate stereotypes of
incompetence and attitudes of intolerance that have plagued the disabled
for generations. 79 The ADA might simply have designated the disabled
as a protected class, and prohibited employers from discriminating
against them. In creating the duty to make reasonable accommodations,
Congress established an affirmative obligation on employers, which
exceeds the obligation created under any other civil rights law. It is
tantamount to affirmative action. Making court-ordered affirmative
action mandatory in appropriate race cases would bring the doctrines into
172. Id. at 407-08.
173. Id. at 413.
174. Id. at 409-10.
175. The Court referred to HEW regulations that imposed an affirmative action
obligation on the college, as a recipient of federal funds. Id. at 398. Consistent with the
statutory duty to make reasonable accommodations, the affirmative action obligation was
arguably broader, listing potential modifications such as extending the time for
completing the program and substituting certain courses for others in the nursing
program. Id. at 408 n.9; see 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1978).
176. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
177. See Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652-53 (2d Cir. 1982) (criticizing the
Supreme Court for using the term "affirmative action" in a reasonable accommodation
case, because affirmative action involves lowering standards, whereas reasonable
accommodation means removing existing barriers).
178. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 n.20.
179. See Befort & Donesky, supra note 117, at 1082 n.246 (pointing out that the duty
to make reasonable accommodations under the ADA and affirmative action both attempt
to remedy the effects of past discrimination).
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alignment and would better implement the remedial goals of Title VII.
5. The Constitutional Distinction
To understand why Congress has been more timid in protecting the
rights of racial minorities than in protecting the rights of the disabled,
one must consider the constitutional distinction between the two
protected groups. By enacting special provisions to help the disabled,
Congress did not infringe on the rights of a protected class.' 80  Race,
however, garners the highest degree of constitutional protection.' 81 Thus,
governmentally compelled affirmative action, including court-ordered
affirmative action, must meet a demanding constitutional test.'
82
In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers International Association v.
EEOC,'83 and United States v. Paradise,184 the Supreme Court discussed
both the Title VII and constitutional standards for compelling a civil
rights violator to engage in affirmative action. Although the Court did
not adopt a clear-cut constitutional standard, it seemed to approve of
180. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985), the Court
concluded that a classification based on mental retardation was not a quasi-suspect
classification and was, therefore, subject to the rational basis test rather than intermediate
or strict scrutiny. The Court explained this decision by contrasting race, alienage, and
national origin, which receive strict scrutiny analysis, with mental retardation. Id at 440.
The classifications subject to strict scrutiny are seldom linked to any state interest and
most laws based on these classifications evidence prejudice and antipathy. Id. Although
acknowledging that the mentally retarded suffer instances of invidious discrimination, the
Court stressed that the state may take mental retardation into account in a wide variety of
situations. Id. at 446; see Stephen L. Mikochik, The Constitution and the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Some First Impressions, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 619, 627 (1991)
(contending that although the Court in Cleburne did not declare disability a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification, the Court nonetheless applied a somewhat heightened level
of scrutiny); see also Welsh v. City of Tulsa, 977 F.2d 1415, 1420 (10th Cir. 1992)
(confirming that being handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act does
not entitle a person to strict scrutiny protections). One might conclude that, because race
receives strict scrutiny analysis and disability does not, that blacks would benefit from a
higher level of constitutional protection. Ironically, this is not necessarily the case
because all race-conscious affirmative action, even when adopted to benefit minorities, is
subjected to strict scrutiny, and thus governmental affirmative action regimes, whether
voluntary or court imposed, are difficult to justify constitutionally. See Jed Rubenfeld,
The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1172 (2002) (arguing that the
disabled receive more constitutional protection than blacks).
181. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (reaffirming the principle
that racial classifications are highly suspect and are subject to the most rigid scrutiny);
see also Welsh, 977 F.2d at 1420 (confirming that being handicapped within the meaning
of the Rehabilitation Act does not entitle a person to strict scrutiny protections).
182. See 5 LARSON, supra note 24, § 94.02, at 94-3 (noting that, by ordering a private
party to engage in affirmative action, a court, as a state actor, invokes constitutional strict
scrutiny).
183. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
184. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
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court-ordered affirmative action to remedy only flagrant or persistent
violations. 185  To the extent that the Court permitted the discretionary
imposition of affirmative action, the remedy could and should be
mandatory because it is the most effective means of rectifying systemic
violations of Title VII. If affirmative action were mandatory in such
circumstances, the protections afforded racial minorities would be
brought into parity with the protections afforded the disabled. In
addition, if the Court did limit court-ordered affirmative action to only
the most serious violations, the Court should reconsider its position. Any
civil rights violation based on a statistical imbalance between minority
workers in an employer's workforce compared to minority workers in the
relevant labor market should trigger mandatory affirmative action relief.
No violation is minor, and no remedy works as swiftly and surely as
affirmative action in ending the lingering effects of past discrimination.
As shown below, a court-ordered affirmative action plan in any disparate
impact or pattern and practice case meets constitutional requirements as
long as the plan is narrowly tailored to eliminate the violation without
trammeling the rights of unprotected workers and without unduly
burdening the employer.'
1 86
III. A Proposal for Mandatory Court-Ordered Affirmative Action
A. The Legal Requirements for Court-Ordered Affirmative Action
In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers International Association v.
EEOC,187 Local 28 and the Joint Apprenticeship Committee (JAC),
which Local 28 operated with management, rampantly discriminated
against minority workers in recruitment, selection, training, and
admission into the union.1 88 After a bench trial, the court found that the
union 89 had flouted previous court orders and had persisted in
discriminating against minority workers. 90 The court ordered the union
185. Id. at 185-86; Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 482-83 (1986).
186. See 1 PAuL N. Cox, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 11.01[2], at 11-7 to -8 (3d
ed. 1999) (suggesting that disparate impact theory and systemic disparate treatment
theory justify court-ordered affirmative action because both violations are based on
statistical disparities that affirmative action can rectify).
187. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
188. Id. at 429.
189. The "petitioners" will hereinafter be referred to collectively in the text as the
"union" or "Local 28."
190. Id. at 432. This case had a long and tortuous history. The New York State
Commission for Human Rights found that petitioners excluded minorities from the union
and the apprenticeship program, and issued a cease and desist order, confirmed by the
New York State Supreme Court. Id. at 427. The court order proved ineffective,
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to meet a twenty-nine percent goal of minority membership by a
specified date.' 9 ' The court also ordered the union, under the supervision
of a court-appointed administrator, to design and implement recruitment
and admissions procedures to achieve that goal. 92 Following a proposal
made by the administrator, the court adopted an affirmative action
program, which required the union to recruit and admit minority
workers. 193  After years of the union's refusal to comply with these
orders, the district court twice held it in contempt.' 94  At the second
contempt proceeding, the court ordered the union to establish a fund to
promote the recruitment of minority applicants for the apprenticeship
program and to provide minority apprentices with special training and
counseling programs and with financial aid.' 95
Local 28 argued to the Supreme Court that the court orders violated
Title VII by granting preferential treatment to minority workers who
were not victims of discrimination. 96 After analyzing the language of
section 706(g), legislative history, and prior judicial decisions, Justice
Brennan, writing for a plurality,' 97 rejected this argument.'98 Though the
prompting the Commission to commence further proceedings against the petitioners,
which resulted in additional state court orders. Id. at 428. Seven years after the initial
action at the Human Rights Commission, the United States initiated a federal court action
against the petitioners. Id. at 428-29. The district court conducted a trial and concluded,
as had the state court, that the petitioners were engaging in a pattern and practice of
discrimination against minorities. Finding numerous instances of bad faith, the court
imposed on the union the twenty-nine percent minority membership goal. Id at 429-32.
The Second Circuit chastised the petitioners for "egregiously" violating Title VII, and
affirmed the order in most respects. Id. at 433. The court modified the order in
connection with the apprenticeship program, and remanded the case to the district court.
Id. On remand, the district court accommodated the petitioners by giving them an
additional year to meet the twenty-nine percent goal and established other goals for the
union. Id. at 433-34. The petitioners appealed again, and this time the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's order in its entirety. Id. at 434. Based on the petitioners'
failure to comply with the revised order, the city and state moved in district court to hold
the petitioners in contempt. Id. The court granted the motion and fined petitioners
$150,000 to be placed in a fund designed to foster increased minority membership in the
union and apprenticeship program. Id. at 435. The city then brought a second contempt
motion, which the district court granted. Id. at 435-36. A divided Second Circuit
affirmed the contempt orders. Id. at 438.
191. Id. at 432. The goal was based on the percentage of minority workers in the
relevant labor market. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at433.
194. Id. at 434-37.
195. Id. at 436-37.
196. Id. at 444-45. Justice Rehnquist agreed with the union's position. Id. at 500
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He interpreted section 706(g) to disallow preferential
treatment to those who were not victims of a defendant's discrimination. Id. (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
197. Justice Powell concurred in all but those parts of the plurality opinion that
hedged on the applicability of the strict scrutiny standard. Id at 484-85 (Powell, J.,
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Court would not countenance affirmative action "simply to create a
racially balanced work force," or as a knee-jerk judicial response to
proven acts of past discrimination,1 99 it approved the discretionary
imposition of such relief to combat "persistent or egregious
discrimination" or "to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive
discrimination. ' '20 Seeking to eliminate an "egregious" violation,
however, imposes a more restrictive standard than seeking "to dissipate
the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination," or seeking to eliminate
a "persistent" violation, unless by "persistent" the Court secretly meant
unusually persistent. As discussed in more detail in Parts III.C.1 and
III.C.2, all statistical, systemic civil rights violations are by definition
"pervasive." Likewise, by the time courts or juries find civil rights
violations, the discriminatory conduct has had "lingering effects" and is
"persistent" as that term is commonly understood. Thus, the alternative
conditions for the imposition of court-ordered affirmative action appear
contradictory.
To comply with Title VII, a court-ordered affirmative action
program had to meet certain criteria. First, the program had to seek to
remedy the present effects of the employer's past discrimination.'
Justice Brennan stressed that the lower court had twice adjusted the
deadlines for achieving the numerical goals and had continually altered
the size of apprenticeship classes to reflect changing economic
conditions.20 2  Such flexibility showed that the program had not
established quotas, but rather had sought compliance with previous court
orders.20 3 Second, as in Weber, the affirmative action program had to be
concurring in part and in the judgment). Accordingly, this article will refer to the
plurality opinion as the opinion of the Court where appropriate.
198. Id. at 475. The Sheet Metal Workers Court distinguished a previous Supreme
Court decision, Firefighter Local 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580 (1984), which had
limited individual remedies, such as back pay, to those who could establish injury. The
Stotts Court stated that section 706(g) of Title VII seeks "to provide make-whole relief
only to those who have been actual victims of discrimination." Id. at 579-80. This
comment in Stotts might have been interpreted to bar court-ordered affirmative action
altogether because such a remedy benefits some who were not victims of the employer's
discrimination. In the judgment of the Sheet Metal Workers Court, however, the
comment in Stotts did not apply to group-oriented remedies such as court-ordered
affirmative action, but applied only to individual remedies. Sheet Metal Workers, 478
U.S. at 473-74. See generally Patricia M. Smith, Consent Decrees Not Orders of the
Court Within the Ambit of Section 706(g) of Title VII, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 493, 501-03
(1987) (summarizing the Court's reasoning).
199. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 475-76.
200. Id. at 476.
201. Id. at 477.




temporary.2 °4  The Court noted that, as soon as Local 28 met the
membership goal and had remedied the effects of past discrimination, the
orders would dissolve. 20 5 Finally, also as in Weber, the plan could not
trammel the rights of white employees.20 6 The orders in Sheet Metal
Workers did not require that any white workers be laid off and the orders
did not disadvantage incumbent union workers in any way. Nor did the
program bar the admission of white workers into union ranks.20 7 Justice
Brennan observed that the order creating the fund permitted white as
well as black workers to enjoy the fund's training and counseling
programs and its financial benefits.20 8
Local 28 also challenged the affirmative action program on Equal
Protection grounds. The Court began its analysis noting that it had
consistently upheld affirmative action plans under constitutional
challenge, when the purpose of the plans was to remedy the "past
discrimination" of the party undertaking the plan.20 9  This
pronouncement reconfirmed previous declarations in Wygant v. Board of
Education21 ° and Fillilove v. Klutznick,2 1' though in those cases, unlike
the Sheet Metal Workers case, the Court confronted voluntary,
governmental affirmative action. In Wygant, the Court struck down an
affirmative action plan that gave minority teachers a preference against
layoffs.2 12 Justice Powell, in the plurality opinion in Wygant, noted that
204. Id. at 479.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. Justice O'Connor characterized the membership goals as impermissible
quotas, which violate Title VII. Id. at 489 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She based her
argument on section 703(j), which provides: "Nothing contained in this title shall be
interpreted to require any employer.., to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of the race... on account of [a racial] imbalance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(j) (2002). This provision, Justice O'Connor reasoned, limited the permissible
range of affirmative action remedies under section 706(g), the section that permits courts
to order affirmative action relief. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 491 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The plurality responded that section 7030) merely established the
permissibility of racial imbalances. Id. at 465 n.37. This subsection assured employers
with such imbalances that they did not have to resort to preferences to avoid liability or
fear that the EEOC or a court would order them to implement preferences. The
subsection did not bar courts from ordering employers to engage in affirmative action.
Id.
208. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 479.
209. Id. at 480.
210. 476 U.S 267, 278 (1986).
211. 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (deferring to congressional authority in upholding,
against constitutional challenge, a ten percent federal set-aside program for minority
businesses).
212. 476 U.S. at 284. The Court ruled that the plan was not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest, even if one existed. Id. The preference against
layoffs imposed so serious a burden on non-protected individuals that it was not narrowly
tailored for purposes of constitutional analysis. Id. Justice Marshall argued that the
[Vol. 107:3
UNDO HARDSHIP
societal discrimination never justifies an affirmative action plan.213
Rather, the facts must establish prior discrimination by the governmental
unit adopting the plan.214 Thus, according to Wygant, a state actor may
engage in affirmative action to remedy its own past discrimination.
It is beyond question that governmental violations heighten the state
interest in eliminating past discrimination, because the government's job
is to lead the nation away from racial bias, not to foster it. Since the
union in Sheet Metal Workers was not a governmental unit, one could
argue that the interest in eliminating past discrimination was not as
strong in Sheet Metal Workers as it was in Wygant. This observation
might explain why the Sheet Metal Workers Court seemed to require an
"egregious or persistent" violation. 215 But in Sheet Metal Workers the
union had not engaged merely in past discrimination. The union was
engaged in a present pattern and practice of discrimination.216 The
union's current violation presented a uniquely compelling state interest:
dismantling an ongoing civil rights violation. The interest to end
ongoing discriminatory conduct by a private actor equals or even
surpasses the interest in ending the effects of past discrimination by a
state actor. Thus, regardless of the egregiousness or persistence of the
violation, the state interest in Sheet Metal Workers supported court-
ordered affirmative action.
One can read Sheet Metal Workers to support this position. When
announcing that the state has a compelling interest to remove the effects
of past discrimination, the Sheet Metal Workers Court did not distinguish
between state and private action.21 7 Nor did it assert that the state has a
compelling interest to eradicate only flagrant private violations. 21 8  It
implied, therefore, that the state has a compelling interest in ending the
present effects of any past discriminatory conduct. It follows that the
state has an even stronger interest in eliminating the effects of an
ongoing violation. Court-ordered affirmative action would therefore be
appropriate to remedy any systemic violation of civil rights law. 219 It
layoff priority was narrowly tailored. Id. at 309 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He pointed
out that the layoff priority was not a method for increasing minority representation in the
board's roster of teachers. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at274.
214. Id.; see also id. at 278 n.5. Justice Marshall argued that the past discriminatory
conduct of the Jackson school system and the need to maintain the levels of integration
previously achieved warranted giving a priority against layoffs to minority teachers. Id
at 303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445
(1986).
216. Id. at 429-34.
217. See id. at 480.
218. See id at 480-81.
219. One author criticizes Sheet Metal Workers for allowing court-ordered affirmative
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must be admitted, however, that the Court, in concluding that the
violation in Sheet Metal Workers invoked a compelling state interest,
alluded to the "egregiousness" of the union's conduct. 220  The Court
might simply have been saying that the petitioners' contumacious
behavior not only met but even exceeded equal protection requirements,
but it seems that, despite its unqualified condemnation of the effects of
past discrimination, the Court required an "egregious or persistent"
violation to meet the constitutional test. Nevertheless, the Court's
recognition of the compelling state interest to remove the effects of past
discrimination conflicts with limiting court-ordered affirmative action to
"persistent or egregious" violations.
As part of its Title VII analysis, the Sheet Metal Workers Court
stated that court-ordered affirmative action was permissible to remove
"the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." 22' Since the Court
seemed to transplant the "persistent or egregious" factor from its Title
VII analysis to its constitutional analysis, one may reasonably infer that
the Court meant also to include the "lingering effects" factor as part of its
constitutional analysis. Though the Court, in its constitutional analysis,
made no specific reference to the lingering effects of the union's
pervasive discrimination, it said nothing to suggest that it meant to
222exclude this factor. As noted above, however, permitting affirmative
action to eliminate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination
establishes a less stringent standard than does permitting affirmative
action to eliminate "egregious" violations. Similarly, a "persistent"
violation standard appears to establish a standard more permissive than
an "egregious" violation standard. Thus, the Court's constitutional
analysis is self-contradictory. To the extent that the Court excluded
court-ordered affirmative action to remedy ordinary violations, the Court
undermined its ruling with conflated language and contradictory
statements. The contradictions and confusions are a telltale sign that the
Court stumbled when it attempted to limit court-ordered affirmative
action to unusual violations.
The Court then analyzed whether the remedy was narrowly tailored
action only for "egregious" violations. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:
Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78, 89-90 (1986). She
disagrees that a violator must have engaged in "sinful" conduct before affirmative action
is justifiable because requiring "sin" perpetuates the argument that voluntary affirmative
action unfairly benefits non-victims and harms innocent third parties. Id. at 95-96. In her
view, averting racial tensions, courting black customers, and advancing diversity all
should legally justify voluntary affirmative action. Id. at 96.
220. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 480-81.




to accomplish a compelling state interest.223  The district court had
considered, and rejected ordering weaker remedies, which, in light of the
union's long record of intransigence, were not likely to soften its resolve
to continue its discriminatory practices.22 4  Thus, the Court considered
the persistence and egregiousness of the violation as a factor in
determining whether the remedy was narrowly tailored.225  One might
interpret the Court's analysis as indicating that only an egregious
violation justified the harsh court-imposed quotas, and that a violation
short of egregious might have supported a more moderate form of
affirmative action. But, given the tenor of the opinion, such an
interpretation is perhaps fanciful.
A core issue of the "narrowly tailored" prong is whether the plan
punishes white workers. If the plan trammels the rights of white
workers, it is unconstitutional.2 26  In Sheet Metal Workers Justice
Brennan correctly emphasized this aspect of the Equal Protection test.227
It was most critical to him that the plan did not affect existing union
workers and that, after issuance of the court order, whites composed the
majority of new union members. 228  The Court concluded that the
challenged program met even the rigors of strict scrutiny, since the
program was "narrowly tailored to further the Government's compelling
interest in remedying past discrimination.,
229
Though the Court declined to adopt the strict scrutiny test or any
other less demanding constitutional standard, it sustained the lower
court's decree because the facts supported the plan even under the rigors
of strict scrutiny. 230  This test includes two inquiries: whether a
compelling state interest supports the challenged governmental activity,
and whether the remedy is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.23' The
223. Id. at 481.
224. Id.
225. Id.




229. Id. at 480. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, cited five factors relevant to
whether the remedy was narrowly tailored: (1) the efficacy of alternative remedies, (2)
the planned duration of the remedy, (3) the relationship between the percentage of
minority workers to be employed and the percentage of minority workers in the relevant
labor market, (4) the availability of a waiver provision if the plan's goals could not be
met, and (5) the effects on innocent third parties. Id. at 486 (Powell, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Powell concluded that the affirmative action
plan in Sheet Metal Workers met this test. Id. at 485 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
230. Id. at 480.
231. E.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[W]e hold today
that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government
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Sheet Metal Workers case illustrates that the two inquiries overlap.2 32
Asking if a violation implicates a compelling state interest requires
analysis of the extent of the violation: the more serious a violation, the
more likely the conclusion that it implicates a compelling state interest.
Asking if a remedy is narrowly tailored to meet that interest also requires
analysis of the extent of the violation: the more serious the violation, the
more forceful the remedy must be to correct it. The egregiousness of the
offense, however, should not have entered into the Court's calculus of
whether a compelling state interest supported an affirmative action
remedy. A serious violation should be a sufficient but not a necessary
precondition of court-ordered affirmative action.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the propriety of court-ordered
affirmative action in United States v. Paradise.233  This case differed
from Sheet Metal Workers in at least one material respect. Sheet Metal
Workers involved a civil rights violation by private parties, whereas
Paradise involved a violation by a state actor. 234  In Paradise, the
Alabama Department of Public Safety had long engaged in a pattern and
practice of intentionally excluding blacks from employment as state
troopers. 235 The district court ordered the Department to hire as many
black troopers as white troopers until the force was twenty-five percent
black, and later, in response to the Department's resistance to integrating
its force, the court ordered the Department to promote one black trooper
for every white trooper until twenty-five percent of corporals on the
force were black.236 The Department challenged the latter order. Justice
Brennan, again writing for a plurality, 237 declared that "[t]he Government
unquestionably has a compelling interest in remedying past and present
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling governmental interests.").
232. See Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. 421.
233. 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987).
234. Id. at 153; Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 426.
235. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149.
236. Id. at 154-55.
237. Even the dissenters agreed that Title VII empowered the lower court to fashion
affirmative action relief, that the egregious conduct of the petitioners justified the
imposition of the relief, and that the Constitution allows for such relief to vindicate a
compelling state interest. See id. at 196 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The principal point
of disagreement between the plurality and the dissent was whether the remedy imposed in
the case was narrowly tailored. See id at 197 (O'Connor J., dissenting). Justice Stevens,
who concurred in the judgment, would have granted the district court wider latitude than
the plurality envisioned, discarding the "narrow tailoring" prong of the constitutional test
once an egregious violation was established. Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). Thus, with respect to the points of agreement among the Justices, this article
will refer to the plurality opinion as the opinion of the Court.
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discrimination by a state actor."
238
Having recognized this compelling state interest, the Court turned to
whether the affirmative action plan was narrowly tailored for
239constitutional purposes. Justice Brennan explained that a remedy can
be narrowly tailored and yet not be the least restrictive means of
achieving the objective.240 He identified several factors bearing on the
issue of whether the plan was narrowly tailored, including the need for
the relief in view of other potential remedies, the flexibility and duration
of the relief, the relationship of numerical goals to the relevant labor
market, and the impact of the relief on third parties. 241 The Department's
obstinate refusal to integrate blacks into the force showed the inadequacy
of other remedies and justified the imposition of the one-for-one
promotion requirement.242 Justice Brennan also found the plan flexible
since the order provided that enforcement of the one-for-one promotion
requirement depended on the availability of qualified black applicants.243
The one-for-one requirement was also temporary, ending as soon as the
Department implemented non-discriminatory procedures.2" The
government opposed the one-for-one requirement, arguing that the fifty
percent promotion rate bore no relationship to the relevant labor
market.245 Justice Brennan rejected this argument, pointing out that the
plan's goal of twenty-five percent black corporals was in line with the
percentage of blacks in the labor market.246 Finally, he found that the
plan did not unacceptably burden whites because the plan was flexible,
and, even when the Department applied the quota, fifty percent of
promotions still went to white troopers.247
238. Id. at 167.
239. Id. at 171.
240. Id. at 184.
241. Id. at 171 (citing Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478
U.S. 421 (1986)).
242. Id. at 171-176.
243. Id. at 177. Also, the plan could be altered to conform to budgetary constraints,
thereby avoiding gratuitous promotions. Id. at 177-78.
244. Id. at 178-79.
245. Id. at 179.
246. Id. The Supreme Court deferred to the discretion of the district court, reiterating
that the Department had resisted prior orders to halt its discriminatory practices. Id. at
180-81. The Court also noted that the district court considered and rejected imposing an
even more extreme quota on the Department. Id. at 181.
247. Id. at 182. Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's view that the one-for-
one quota was a narrowly tailored remedy. Id. at 197 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). A
lockstep hiring or promotion rule, she argued, must in nearly all cases conform to the
percentage of qualified minority workers in the relevant population or workforce. Since
the decree had no such evidentiary support, it was not narrowly tailored for purposes of
constitutional analysis. Id. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor also
criticized the majority for allowing the rights of non-minority workers to be trammeled.
She suggested that a less draconian measure would have been for the court to appoint a
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One of the lessons of Paradise is that the harshness of the
affirmative action plan must be commensurate with the seriousness of the
violation. In Paradise, an egregious violation justified stem remedial
measures.248 One might reason from this premise that the Constitution
allows less intrusive court-ordered affirmative action for violations
falling short of egregious. If a violator is contrite and cooperative, a
court may adopt a mild affirmative action plan such as directing the
violator to take affirmative steps to bring its workforce into balance with
the relevant labor market over an established time period, subject to
judicial oversight.249 A court might not even specify numerical goals on
a compliant offender. It is hard to imagine how such a moderate remedy
violates the Constitution.
B. The Strict Scrutiny Test
Although the Supreme Court concluded in Paradise that the court-
ordered affirmative action plan met even the strict scrutiny test, the Court
refused, as it had in Sheet Metal Workers, to commit itself to strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or any other test. 25  Two subsequent
Supreme Court cases, Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 251 and Adarand
252Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 2 supplied the answer, though neither case
involved court-ordered affirmative action. In Croson, a construction
company attacked, on Equal Protection grounds, a program adopted by
the City of Richmond setting aside thirty percent of the dollar value of
construction subcontracts for minority-owned firmS. 253  Striking down
the program, the Court applied the strict scrutiny test, stressing that the
constitutional standard does not vary with the race of "those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification. '25 4 Similar to Wygant, Croson
refused to countenance race-conscious affirmative action based on the
trustee to assure compliance with prior court orders. Id. at 199-200 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
248. See id. at 176-79.
249. See NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1991)
(imposing a mild form of affirmative action on Harrison, where Harrison showed no
hostility toward compliance with the court's order).
250. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 166-67.
251. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
252. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
253. 488 U.S. at 479-80.
254. Id. at 494. Rather than the compelling state interest test, Justice Marshall would
have applied the "important" state interest test to measure the constitutionality of
remedial affirmative action programs, but, in any event, Justice Marshall found the
compelling state interest satisfied by the need to eradicate the present effects of past
discrimination and by the need to curtail government dollars from perpetuating
discrimination. Id. at 535-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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past discrimination of the nation's construction industry.255 Affirmative
action would be permissible only if the City had discriminated in the
past256 or if, as a passive participant, the City, by awarding contracts to
non-minority firms, had perpetuated prior discrimination in the local
construction industry.257 The City made no such factual showing.25 8
In Adarand, the Court extended the holding of Croson to federal
affirmative action tested against the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 259  Mountain Gravel & Construction Company won a
United States government contract.260  The contract provided that, if
Mountain Gravel hired minority-owned subcontractors, it would receive
additional compensation. 261 To earn the extra compensation, Mountain
Gravel awarded a subcontract to Gonzales Construction Company, a
minority-owned business, rather than to Adarand, the lowest bidder. 62
Adarand commenced an action, arguing that the preference for
disadvantaged small business owners violated the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of due process.263
The Supreme Court held that, whether under Fifth Amendment Due
Process or Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, any race-based
classification, even if protective of minority interests, is subject to strict
scrutiny.264  The test requires that such classifications be "narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. 265
Yet, the Court seemed to contradict the "consistency 266 principle of
255. Id. 498-99. Opponents of the plan noted that only 4.7 percent of the nation's
construction firms were minority owned, and that forty-one percent of those firms were
located in California, New York, Illinois, Florida, and Hawaii. They predicted that the
thirty percent set-aside would result in a windfall to the few minority-owned construction
firms in the Richmond area. Id. at 481.
256. Id. at 492.
257. Id. at 498-99.
258. Id. at 500-04. Justice Marshall wrote in dissent for three Justices. Id. at 528
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He argued that Richmond had made an adequate showing of
the exclusion of black contractors from the construction industry. Coupled with the
nationwide exclusion of black contractors from this industry, he concluded that
Richmond amply supported its case for the set-aside program. Id. at 534-35 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
259. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
260. Id. at 205.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 205-06.
264. Id. at 224 (labeling this parallelism in the strict scrutiny analysis "congruence");
see Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84
CAL. L. REv. 1179, 1186-88 (1996) (commenting that the Adarand Court confirmed the
Croson Court's adoption of strict scrutiny and questioning whether the Court's
skepticism of affirmative action has any constitutional basis).
265. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
266. Id. at 224. In addition to "consistency," and "congruence," the Court articulated
a third component of a strict scrutiny analysis, "skepticism," which means that any
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universally applying strict scrutiny by stating that strict scrutiny allows
for taking "relevant differences" into account when analyzing race-based
267classifications. Although Adarand muddled the constitutional
standard, it nevertheless confirmed that strict scrutiny applies to any
race-based classifications, even those designed to benefit minorities. By
implication, this standard applies to court-ordered affirmative action.
268
Strict scrutiny constrains both legislative and judicial authority from
imposing race-conscious affirmative action obligations on employers.
As noted above, disability is not a suspect classification, so strict scrutiny
analysis did not prevent Congress from requiring employers to provide
the disabled with reasonable accommodations. 269 The issue is whether
mandatory court-ordered affirmative action is a desirable remedy in
certain racial discrimination cases. If it is, the next issue is whether and
under what circumstances this remedy is permissible under constitutional
requirements.
C. Systemic Violations with Statistical Disparities
As noted, one may read Sheet Metal Workers to interpret strict
scrutiny as permitting court-ordered affirmative action to remedy any
statistical, systemic civil rights violation, though the Court seemed to
require an "egregious or persistent" violation. 270 If the more permissive
reading is correct, there is no constitutional impediment to mandatory
court-ordered affirmative action for systemic violations, which include
disparate impact and pattern and practice cases. Congress could amend
Title VII to compel courts to impose the remedy. But such a reading of
Sheet Metal Workers would result in an anomaly: a more stringent
affirmative action standard under Title VII than under Equal Protection's
strict scrutiny analysis. It seems likely, therefore, that the Sheet Metal
Workers Court interpreted strict scrutiny to allow court-ordered
affirmative action to eliminate only "persistent or egregious"
classification based on race or ethnicity "must necessarily receive a most searching
examination." Id. at 223.
267. Id. at 228. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, repudiated the
"consistency" principle. Id. at 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He scolded the majority for
treating race-based affirmative action as the moral and legal equivalent of policies that
subjugate the disadvantaged and perpetuate the power of the majority. Id.
268. See 5 LARSON, supra note 24, §§ 94.02-94.05, at 94-2 to -17 (analyzing the
dimensions of court-ordered affirmative action).
269. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (citing authority for the proposition
that the disabled are not a suspect class, and therefore that strict scrutiny does not apply
to classifications based on disability).




discrimination. 271 Such a reading would exclude the use of affirmative
action from remedying ordinary violations.272
If the Court meant to limit court-ordered affirmative action to
"extraordinary" cases, the Court lost sight of the fundamental purpose of
civil rights law. The public policy to eradicate discrimination does not
condemn only persistent or egregious violations; it deplores any
violation. 73 It is ironic that the Court acknowledged this policy in the
Sheet Metal Workers decision, and then seemed to ignore it. One cannot
exaggerate the primacy of the public policy to end discrimination in the
workplace. 74 The abundance of employment discrimination cases filed
each year by minority workers attests to how compelling the policy is.
Mistreatment of minority workers, although less endemic today than it
was thirty years ago, still haunts the workplace. 275 Such violations may
occur every day, but there is no such thing as an everyday civil rights
violation.
A compelling state interest arises whenever a violation of Title VII
is grounded on a statistical imbalance between the percentage of minority
workers in an employer's workforce and the percentage of minority
workers in the relevant labor market. Such disparities are the basis of
disparate impact and pattern and practice cases. All disparate impact
cases and pattern and practice cases are "persistent." Gross imbalances
in the employer's workforce do not arise in a week or a month. They
develop over long periods of time. Litigating a case consumes years.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must issue a
right-to-sue letter,276 and the parties must conduct discovery, make
271. See id.
272. Id. at 477.
273. See McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (announcing
that "it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or
otherwise"); Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 1991) (observing that no
violation of civil rights law is minor).
274. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) ("Congress intended to
prohibit all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment
opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin,
and ordained that its policy of outlawing such discrimination should have the 'highest
priority."') (quoting Alexander v. Denver-Gardner Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)) (citations
omitted); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (observing that a
racial discrimination suit advances "a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority"); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 855 F.2d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing the "national policy of blotting out all vestiges of racial discrimination,
especially in employment, as evidenced by both § 1981 and Title VII").
275. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L REv. 458, 468 (2001) (arguing that, although blatant
discrimination still exists, more subtle forms of discrimination, based on organizational
structures and interactive patterns, abound).
276. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2001). The regulations provide that the EEOC will
issue a right-to-sue letter at the written request of a person charging a non-governmental
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whatever motions they deem appropriate, and try the case. If the
employer has not dismantled the discriminatory practice by the time the
district court is considering remedies, the court faces a practice that has
attained a ripe old age. The absence of an egregious offense does not
mitigate the appropriateness of court-ordered affirmative action.
Disparate impact and pattern and practice cases are based not on single
acts but on systemic discrimination.277 The urgency of eliminating the
effects of such violations is manifest. If the objective is to erase the
present effects of past discrimination, affirmative action is essential
because no other remedy will achieve the goal as effectively.
Any affirmative action plan must, as Adarand instructs, be narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest. 278  The Sheet Metal
Workers Court correctly considered the elements of a valid plan-
flexibility, non-permanence and protection of non-minority workers'
rights-as relevant to meeting the "narrowly tailored" prong of the
constitutional test.279  To meet this prong, the requirements of a
mandatory plan should not tax the resources, human or financial, of the
defendant. A plan, in such a case, would dissolve once its stated goals
were attained. 280  Absent a disparity in the workforce, an affirmative
action plan could have no discernible targets and no meaningful purpose.
Under such circumstances, affirmative action would not meet the
"narrowly tailored" prong of the constitutional test because such a
entity with a violation, promptly upon the expiration of 180 days after the complainant
filed the charge, unless the EEOC cannot complete its investigation of the charge within
180 days, in which case it may issue the letter before that period expires. Id.
§ 1601.28(a)(1)-(2). Where the EEOC, having found reasonable cause of a violation, is
unable to secure voluntary compliance and has decided not to bring a civil action against
the respondent, the EEOC may issue a right-to-sue letter at any time. Id. § 1601.28(b).
Where a governmental entity is charged with a violation, the EEOC must issue a right-to-
sue letter when there has been a dismissal of the charge. Otherwise, the Attorney General
will issue a right-to-sue letter where the EEOC, having found reasonable cause of a
violation, has failed to conciliate the case and the Attorney General has decided not to
commence a civil action against the governmental entity, or where the charging party has
requested such a letter pursuant to section 1601.28(a)(1) or (a)(2). Id. § 160 1(d).
277. See Leland B. Ware, A Remedy for the "Extreme Case:" The Status of
Affirmative Action After Croson, 55 Mo. L. REV. 631, 702 (1990) ("Affirmative action is
an equitable means of effectuating the transition from a deeply rooted system of
discrimination to the colorblind goals of the Equal Protection Clause. There are,
however, far more 'extreme' cases than the majority seems to realize. In cases involving
longstanding or systemic discrimination, race-conscious remedies will likely prove to be
the only effective means of dismantling the vestiges of a segregated society even when
the stringent Croson standard is applied.").
278. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1996).
279. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481
(1986).
280. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185 (1987) (upholding a court-




remedy would be disproportionate in scope and inappropriate in nature.
The Sheet Metal Workers Court also considered the "efficacy of
alternative remedies" in analyzing whether the imposition of affirmative
action was "narrowly tailored" for constitutional purposes. 281 The Court
found that the recalcitrance of the union justified an extraordinary
remedy because other less extreme remedies would have been
ineffective.282 The union's intransigence, however, should not have
factored significantly into the constitutional analysis of whether the
remedy was "narrowly tailored." It is fanciful to believe that an
employer, even in an unintentional disparate impact case, will voluntarily
reverse the effects of a violation with the same resolve and effectiveness
as it would under the command of a court-ordered affirmative action
program. Few employers will eagerly assume the costs, financial and
otherwise. A declaratory judgment will not impel an employer to self-
impose costly remedial action, nor will adequate results follow an
injunction directing the employer to cease discriminatory action.
Discontinuing the violation does not undo the present effects of past
discrimination. No alternative remedy can be as effective as affirmative
action in bringing the violator's workforce into balance.
1. Disparate Impact Violations
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,283 as pre-conditions for hiring and
transfer, Duke Power required a high school diploma and satisfactory
284performance on two standardized intelligence tests. Black employees
at Duke Power's Dan River Steam Station brought a Title VII claim
against Duke Power, arguing that these pre-conditions violated their civil
rights.285 The Court ruled unanimously that an employment practice,
though neutral on its face, can violate Title VII.286 The diploma and test
requirements had the unintentional discriminatory effect of excluding
blacks at a disproportionately higher rate than whites.287  While
281. 478U.S.at481.
282. Id.
283. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
284. Id. at 427-28. Duke Power used two standardized tests: the Wonderlic Personnel
Test and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. The cut-off point for hiring and
transfer eligibility was the median performance of high school graduates. Thus, half of
the population of high school graduates could not have qualified. Id. at 428.
285. Id. at 425-26.
286. Id. at 430. The Court stated that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." Id. at
432; see infra notes 287, 309 (discussing the section 703(h) exemption for professionally
developed tests).
287. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. Section 703(h) of Title VII authorized the use of any
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commending Duke Power for financing two-thirds of the cost of a high
school equivalency diploma for its undereducated employees, the Court
stressed that Title VII is directed at "the consequences of employment
practices, not simply the motivation." 288  Title VII, the Court
acknowledged, does not guarantee jobs to unqualified minorities; rather,
it proscribes discriminatory barriers.2 89 The Court declared that "[t]he
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice [that]
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.
290
Several facts doomed Duke Power's argument that its screening
criteria improved its workforce.291 White employees hired before Duke
Power instituted the high school diploma requirement performed
satisfactorily in job categories that later became subject to that
requirement.292 Most important, Duke Power offered no proof, statistical
or otherwise, that the challenged criteria for hire and promotion bore any
relationship to job performance.293 Duke Power did not even intend to
use the intelligence tests as a measure of ability to perform at any job.294
Although the evidence did not show intentional discrimination, the
very existence of the disparate impact violation should have supported
the imposition of court-ordered affirmative action. Duke Power helped
its employees acquire a high school diploma, but its generosity did not
mitigate the effects of its past discrimination. 295 Providing make-whole
relief to specific victims of Duke Power's practices would benefit those
who went to court, but court-ordered affirmative action would rectify the
underrepresentation of minority employees in Duke Power's workforce.
The magnitude of difference needed to establish a disparate impact
claim eludes mathematical formulation. In Dothard v. Rawlinson,
296
Alabama had a minimum height requirement of five foot, two inches and
a minimum weight requirement of 120 pounds for all law enforcement
officers. Rawlinson, a woman, applied for a position as a correctional
"professionally developed ability test" that is not "designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race." Citing legislative history and EEOC interpretive
guidelines, the Court held that section 703(h) does not exempt professionally developed
tests from disparate impact analysis. Id. at 433-36.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 430-3 1.
290. Id. at 431. The Court also stated that the employer bears the burden of proving a
manifest relationship between the employment practice and job performance. Id. at 432.
291. Id. at431.
292. Id. at 427, 431-32.
293. Id. at 431.
294. Id. at 428.
295. See id at 432.
296. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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counselor trainee.29 7 Rejected for not meeting the weight requirement,
she challenged both requirements on the ground that they had a disparate
298impact on women. The Supreme Court stated: "[T]o establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially
neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly
discriminatory pattern." 299  Statistics established a prima facie case in
Dothard.300  Whereas women composed thirty-seven percent of the
Alabama workforce, women held only thirteen percent of the
correctional counselor positions.3 °1 Combining the height and weight
restrictions excluded forty-one percent of the female population, but
excluded less than one percent of the male population.30 2 The Court
concluded that this evidence established a prima facie case by
"conspicuously" demonstrating a "grossly" discriminatory impact.30 3
The standard articulated in Dothard is not minimal. Such a
violation entails a significant statistical discrepancy. A "gross"
discriminatory impact in an employer's workforce should suffice, from
constitutional and fairness perspectives, for mandatory court-ordered
affirmative action. All disparate impact violations evidence the
"lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." Disparate impact
violations arise from systemic discrimination, which affects the many,
not the few. By definition, such a claim does not flow from non-
pervasive discriminatory acts directed against an individual.
297. Id. at 323-24.
298. Id. at 323.
299. Id. at 329.
300. Id. at 329-30.
301. Id. at 329.
302. Id. at 329-30. Parties to disparate impact cases often dispute the appropriateness
of statistics offered by their adversaries. The appellants in Dothard, which included the
Department of Public Safety of Alabama, contested the validity of Rawlinson's statistical
showing. They argued that using national population statistics conveyed a false
impression because few women may have applied for correctional counselor positions in
the Alabama prison system. Id. at 330. The Court rejected this argument, pointing out
that women, knowing of the height and weight requirements, might have refrained from
applying for such positions. Id. at 331. Many might have viewed such an application as
futile. A process challenged as discriminatory should not escape scrutiny because it
discourages victims from applying. Considering the context of the case before it, the
Court approved the use of national population demographic data, seeing no reason to
believe that the height and weight characteristics of Alabama men and women differed
from the height and weight characteristics of men and women throughout the country. Id.
at 330.
303. Id. at 331. The Court added that, if defendants believed the plaintiffs data
deficient, they might have introduced contradictory evidence. Id. The Dothard
defendants failed to make such an effort. Id. Justice White found the record insufficient
to establish a disparate impact case. Id. at 348 (White, J., dissenting). He questioned
whether national height and weight statistics reflected the characteristics of the actual
pool of women applicants or the pool of women interested in working as contact prison
guards. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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There is a single exception where mandatory court-ordered
affirmative action is inappropriate to remedy a disparate impact
violation. A showing of non-discriminatory "bottom line" statistics
should preclude mandatory court-ordered affirmative action, although the
"bottom line" defense is not generally available in disparate impact
cases. 304 An explanation will clarify the point. In Connecticut v. Teal,
30 5
several black welfare caseworkers failed an eligibility test for promotion
and the department eliminated them from consideration. To evaluate
those who passed the test, the department considered past work
experience, recommendations, and seniority. 30 6 Though statistics proved
that the eligibility test had a disproportionately adverse impact on blacks,
black applicants were promoted at a proportionately higher rate than
were white applicants.0 7 The issue was whether the lack of bottom line
impact excused the adverse impact of the test.30 8 The Court rejected the
"bottom line" defense, 30 9 because Title VII protects individuals, not
groups, from employment discrimination, and, regardless of the bottom
line, the test discriminated against those who failed it.
310
If an employer can establish a "bottom line" defense, the court
should not compel it to adopt an affirmative action plan, even if the
304. The 1991 Civil Rights Act provides that each tier of a multiple component
selection process must be evaluated separately under disparate impact analysis unless it is
impracticable to do so. If the effects of the components are inseparable, the bottom line
result must be considered. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2002).
305. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
306. Id. at 444.
307. See id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 451. The United States as amicus curiae argued that section 703(h)
presented a valid defense in this case. Section 703(h) provides: "[I]t shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer... to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or
action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). The United States
contended that the test was not "designed, intended or used to discriminate," and
therefore Connecticut had a defense. Teal, 457 U.S. at 451. This argument failed. The
Court concluded, as it had long before in Griggs, that a test with a disparate impact on a
protected class is "used" to discriminate, unless the test is related to job performance. Id.
at 452; see supra note 287 and accompanying text (discussing the section 703(h)
exemption for professionally developed tests).
310. Id. at 450-51. Justice Powell, writing for four Justices, dissented. Id. at 456
(Powell, J., dissenting). He argued that disparate impact theory, as opposed to disparate
treatment theory, concerns the effects of employment practices on groups. Id. at 459
(Powell, J., dissenting). He reasoned that it is unfair for the Court to allow the plaintiffs
to use group statistics of their choosing to establish a violation, while preventing the
defendant from using other group statistics to rebut plaintiff's proof. Id. at 460 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Justice Powell predicted that many employers, wary of the expanded
scope of disparate impact liability, might abandon tests altogether and resort to quota
hiring, an unfortunate outcome. Id. at 463 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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plaintiff proves a disparate impact case. Mandatory affirmative action is
justified only when a minority is underrepresented in the employer's
workforce. The "bottom line" defense refutes any claim of
underrepresentation.1  With this single adjustment in place, affirmative
action should be a mandatory remedy in disparate impact cases.
Federal courts have ordered affirmative action relief in disparate
impact cases, sometimes without requiring "egregious" or even
"persistent" violations.31 2 In Bouman v. Block,1 Bouman, a female
311. If statistics do not support disparate impact, they may still support "manifest
imbalance," the standard under the Johnson case, since a showing of manifest imbalance
does not require proof of a violation of Title VII. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480
U.S. 616, 632 (1987). As noted, courts should not order employers to adopt affirmative
action plans without a showing of disparate impact.
312. Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1233 (9th Cir. 1991) (ordering affirmative
action to reverse the effects of an unremarkable disparate impact violation by a sheriff's
department); see NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 807 (3d Cir. 1991)
(decreeing the implementation of a modest affirmative action plan where the town had a
long-standing residence requirement for municipal workers, which had a disparate impact
on minority workers). But see Eldredge v. Carpenters 46, 94 F.3d 1366, 1371 (9th Cir.
1996) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering affirmative
action where a joint labor-management apprenticeship committee resisted dismantling a
system that excluded women from the carpentry trade, even after twenty-one years of
litigation and three appeals); Catlett v. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 828 F.2d 1260,
1269 (8th Cir. 1987) (declining to confirm court-ordered affirmative action because
Missouri had not resisted prior court orders, and had therefore not implicated the state
interest in enforcing compliance with its decrees); Green v. United States Steel Corp.,
640 F. Supp. 1521, 1552 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (refusing to impose an affirmative action plan
absent a showing of bad faith, intentional discrimination, or class-wide discrimination,
despite a persistent violation, and noting that the proposed affirmative action plan would
unnecessarily trammel the rights of inactive non-minority workers who had, under a
union-negotiated contract, recall rights for five years). Using the same constitutional
standard, courts have not required extraordinary circumstances to sustain provisions in
consent decrees providing for state actors to engage in affirmative action. See Stuart v.
Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 449 (1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting an Equal Protection challenge to a
consent decree providing for affirmative action in a disparate impact case where the
violator was the Boston Police Department); Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1003
(lth Cir. 1989) (rejecting an Equal Protection challenge to a consent decree on the
ground that government-affiliated contractor's statistical discrimination against blacks
continued for a period of fifteen years, though the court did not point to any resistance or
contumacious behavior). But see Black Fire Fighter's Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 19 F.3d
992, 996 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming the district court's refusal to approve a consent decree
providing preferential promotions for black fire fighters, because there was no evidence
of an egregious violation). In Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 358 (9th Cir.
1987), the court rejected an Equal Protection challenge to the city's voluntary race-
conscious affirmative action. plan, based on statistical evidence of persistent racial
imbalance in the city's fire department. Despite a low representation of blacks on the
department, no evidence linked the imbalance to discriminatory intent or even
identifiable discriminatory practices. The city demonstrated its good faith by voluntarily
adopting the plan. Id. at 356. Given this rather tepid constitutional basis under the Sheet
Metal Workers standard, the court nonetheless sustained the plan. Id at 358.
313. 940 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1991).
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deputy sheriff, brought several discrimination claims against the Los
Angeles County Sheriffs Department. Bouman alleged that the
eligibility examination for promotion to sergeant had a disparate impact
on women. 314  Statistics showed a solid but not overwhelming case.
Over a two-year period, women deputies passed the three-part
examination and were promoted at roughly two-thirds the rate of men.
315
Based on this data, the district court sustained the claim and ordered the
county to develop a validated sergeant's examination.316 The court also
ordered the county to increase the number of women sergeants until the
department instituted validated selection procedures.317  The county
argued that, given the de minimus nature of the disparate impact
violation, mandatory affirmative action was improper. 31 8  The Ninth
Circuit deferred to the district court's broad equitable powers to
eliminate the effects of past discrimination, noting that no violation is de
minimus. 319 That is exactly the point. Given the urgency of eradicating
racial discrimination, the Constitution should not quibble over how
serious a violation must be to justify affirmative action relief.
In NAACP v. Town of Harrison,32 0 the Third Circuit upheld a court-
ordered affirmative action plan in a disparate impact case. For decades
Harrison, New Jersey, which had a negligible African-American
314. Id. at 1218.
315. Id. at 1225. In Bouman, qualification for promotion depended on written test
scores and appraisal scores. In 1975, of seventy-nine women who took the written test,
ten qualified for promotion. Id. Of the ten who qualified, four were promoted to
sergeant. The same year, of the 1312 who took the written test, 250 qualified for
promotion and 127 were promoted. Id. In 1977, of 102 women who took the written
test, eighteen qualified for promotion. Id. Of the eighteen who qualified, five were
promoted. In the same year, out of the 1259 men who took the written test, 331 qualified
for promotion. Id. Of the 331 who qualified, ninety-three were promoted. Id The court
pointed out that these statistics met the eighty-percent rule suggested by EEOC
guidelines. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.14 at § 4(d) (2001). This rule sets a standard for
establishing a prima facie disparate impact case. To meet the rule, Bouman had to show
that the percentage of female promotions to the percentage of male promotions was equal
to or less than eighty percent. The county argued that the sample size was too small to
justify use of the eighty-percent rule. Bouman, 940 F.2d at 1226. The court point out
that, regardless of the rule, the expert testimony proved that the difference between the
male and female pass rates was statistically significant. Id.
316. Bouman, 940 F.2d at 1238.
317. Id. at 1232 (characterizing the relief as injunctive but nevertheless amounting to
affirmative action). The scope of the order was not burdensome, merely requiring the
county to promote women to sergeant in proportion to their representation as deputies
until non-discriminatory selection procedures were in place. Id at 1233. This order




320. 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991).
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population, required that town employees be town residents.3 2' The
effect of this requirement was that black workers from neighboring
towns could not get municipal work in Harrison. Only a single African-
American had ever held such a municipal job.322 The district court held
that Harrison had committed a disparate impact violation and ordered
Harrison to engage in affirmative action, including the good faith
recruiting and hiring of black applicants in numbers reflecting their
availability in the relevant labor market. 323 The order was to last for five
years subject to Harrison's substantial compliance.324  Harrison
challenged the propriety of the decree. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing
the long history and exclusionary effect of the residence requirement.
325
This case may fit within the Supreme Court's standards for court-
ordered affirmative action because the violation persisted for many years,
but the seriousness of the violation in Harrison contrasts sharply with the
seriousness of the violations in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise.326 No
contemptuous behavior cast doubt on Harrison's willingness to comply
with a remedy less burdensome than affirmative action. The NAACP did
not establish that Harrison acted with discriminatory intent.327 Harrison
did not seem to match the Sheet Metal Worker profile of an offender
needing a remedy as strong as affirmative action. But one might
question what other form of relief would have eliminated the effects of
Harrison's violation. It would have been futile to order Harrison to
provide back pay to black workers who over the years never bothered to
apply to Harrison for a job. Ordering Harrison to abandon its residency
requirement would have been inadequate, because putting an end to the
requirement would not have neutralized its lingering effects.
Although the NAACP did not prove discriminatory intent, the
duration of the violation may have implied improper motive to the
district court judge. 328  One may speculate that such a suspicion
influenced the judge's decision to impose affirmative action relief.
Practices that cause a disparate impact often hint of intentional
321. Id. at 795.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 805-06. The district court required Harrison to advertise on the radio to
enhance black recruitment and established a record-keeping and reporting regimen. Id.
324. Id. at 806.
325. Id. at 807. Citing Sheet Metal Workers, the court noted that the order was
flexible because it was expressly subject to modification. Id. The decree, the court held,
was not "designed to achieve and maintain some arbitrary notion of appropriate racial
balance." Id. Rather, it set a benchmark for measuring the Town's efforts to remedy past
discrimination. Id.
326. Compare id. with United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), and Local 28
of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
327. Harrison, 940 F.2d 792.
328. Id at 807.
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discrimination, but proof of motive often defies detection. 32 9  It is
because proof of intent is so elusive that plaintiffs resort to disparate
impact claims. 330 Blatant discrimination has dwindled under the threat of
Title VII. Modem offenders have cultivated subtlety.331 Such violators
should not escape appropriate remedies, including affirmative action.
The violation in Harrison was "persistent," as are all disparate
impact violations. By the time a court or jury has found a violation, the
offending practice has left infancy far behind. The Supreme Court in
Griggs announced that Title VII is as concerned with the consequences
of discrimination as with the motivations.332  In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States333 and Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,334 the Supreme Court declared that courts have the duty to
impose remedies calculated to remove the effects of past discrimination.
Ordering an end to the offending employment practice will not reverse
its past discriminatory effects. Affirmative action will.
In Harrison, the court did not establish a specific numerical goal or
quotas, or transfer power to an administrator.335  Rather, the court was
content to rely on Harrison's good faith efforts to recruit minority
municipal workers as long as Harrison showed substantial compliance
during the order's five-year effective period.336  This order, less
329. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that intent is not
an element of a disparate impact violation).
330. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), Justice O'Connor
stated:
[E]ven if one assumed that any such [subjective] discrimination can be
adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain. In this case, for
example, petitioner was apparently told at one point that the teller position was
a big responsibility with "a lot of money ... for blacks to have to count."
Id. at 990. Thus, disparate impact theory catches subtle violations that disparate
treatment theory would miss.
331. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 365 (1977) (noting that,
by rebuffing minority applicants, using discriminatory recruitment techniques, and
dissuading casual inquiries, an employer can send subtle messages that minorities need
not apply).
332. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (basing recognition of the
disparate impact doctrine on Congress's concern with the consequences rather than only
the motives of discrimination).
333. 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977).
334. 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) ("Where racial discrimination is concerned, 'the
district court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as
possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar discrimination in
the future."') (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)). Although
the Supreme Court in Teamsters and Albemarle was referring to make-whole relief, the
Court's broad endorsement of Title VII's remedial purposes applies with equal force to
court-ordered affirmative action.
335. See NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792 (3d Cir. 1991).
336 Id. at 806.
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burdensome than those in Sheet Metal Workers and Paradise, shows how
a court can tailor the scope of affirmative action to fit the magnitude of
the violation. This affirmative action plan did not strangle Harrison with
burdensome obligations. It merely prodded Harrison in the right
direction. Critics of affirmative action need not dread the toll a plan will
take on a violator. If a district court punishes a relatively guiltless
offender with an unreasonably harsh plan, appellate review will likely
result in reversal of the order.
2. Pattern and Practice Violations
Unlike disparate impact theory, which prohibits certain facially
neutral employment practices, pattern and practice theory forbids
systemic intentional discrimination. 337 Nevertheless, both theories use a
337. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 (1977)
(remanding a pattern and practice case for consideration of the proper statistical analysis).
Another kind of intentional systemic discrimination case is based on formal policies to
discriminate. These cases usually turn on whether the defendant can prove that a bona
fide occupational qualification supports a facially discriminatory policy. See, e.g., United
Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991) (holding that fetal
protection policy violated Title VII). The other major category of intentional
discrimination is individual disparate treatment. Such cases have two sub-classifications.
One involves direct evidence of intent. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), superseded in part, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m) (2002). The second, which is
perhaps the most common and perplexing type of disparate treatment case, is based on
circumstantial evidence. The seminal circumstantial evidence case, McDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), introduced an elaborate three-stage, burden-shifting
approach. At stage one, the plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of evidence, the
elements of a prima facie case. In a refusal to hire case, for example, the elements are (1)
the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for a job and
applied for it, (3) the defendant rejected the application, and (4) the defendant continued
seeking applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. Id. at 802. At stage two, the defendant
must merely articulate a non-discriminatory reason for refusing to hire the plaintiff. Id.
At stage three, the plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the stage-
two reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. To correct the misconceptions of
several circuit courts, the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), reiterated that the defendant's burden at stage two was
merely one of articulation, rather than persuasion. Though claiming to reaffirm
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, the Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), retreated from both cases, holding that, if a plaintiff
disproved the stage-two reason, the trier of facts could nevertheless find in favor of the
defendant. Id. at 511. See generally Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step,
Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703,
761 (1995) (arguing that the three-step, burden-shifting approach should be abandoned
and replaced with the motivating factor test used in direct evidence cases). In Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000), the Supreme Court further
weakened McDonnell Douglas and Burdine by holding that in some cases, even where
the plaintiff disproves the stage-two reason, the defendant may nevertheless be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
511 (2002) (holding that the liberal federal pleading requirements of Federal Rule of
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similar statistical standard to establish a violation. In International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 331 the United States charged a
trucking company with engaging in an intentional pattern and practice of
racial discrimination that virtually excluded black- and Spanish-
surnamed truck drivers from acquiring lucrative line-driver jobs. The
Court defined a violation as involving "the regular rather than the
unusual practice., 339  Because minority workers held hardly any line
driver jobs but composed a sizable percentage of the relevant population,
the Court found overwhelming evidence of discriminatory intent.340
Pattern and practice cases, by definition, involve widespread rather than
individual discrimination. The very term "pattern and practice" implies
"persistence" and "pervasiveness." The argument for mandatory court-
ordered affirmative action is even stronger in a pattern and practice case
than it is in a disparate impact case because an element of a pattern and
practice case is the intent to discriminate. 34' Relying on the employer's
good faith to reverse the imbalance created by the pattern and practice is
optimistic if not naYve. Both Sheet Metal Workers
342 and Paradise343
were pattern and practice cases. One must wonder if the flagrant but
perhaps not "egregious" violation in Teamsters would have warranted
affirmative action under the Sheet Metal Workers standard. If not, one
must question the wisdom of a standard that exempts such brazen
offenders from the most effective remedial measure.
Civil Procedure 8 apply to complaints alleging discrimination).
338. 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977).
339. Id. at 336.
340. Id. at 339 (dismissing the company's argument that statistics could not establish
a prima facie case of pattern and practice discrimination). The Court, after noting that the
government had introduced evidence of individual instances of discrimination,
announced that statistics alone, when overwhelming, could establish a prima facie case.
Id.
341. Section 2000e-6(a) provides:
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this subchapter, and the pattern or
practice is of such nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights
herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the
appropriate district court of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2002).
342. In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. EEOC,
"petitioners were found guilty of engaging in a pattern and practice of discrimination
against black and Hispanic individuals" in excluding both minorities from union
membership. 478 U.S. 421, 426 (1986).
343. In Paradise, the district court found that the "defendants have engaged in a
blatant and continuous pattern and practice of discrimination, in hiring in the Alabama
Department of Safety, both as to troopers and supporting personnel." United States v.




D. Answering Arguments Against Mandatory Court-Ordered
Affirmative Action
Arguments opposing voluntary affirmative action apply with equal
or even greater force to mandatory affirmative action. In addition,
several objections apply uniquely to mandatory affirmative action as
proposed in this article. Both categories of opposing arguments will be
discussed below.
1. Arguments Against Voluntary Affirmative Action
Many attack affirmative action on value-driven grounds. They
begin with the very ideal that supporters of affirmative action espouse-
our society is committed to racial equality. Critics, however, assert that
affirmative action contradicts that principle. The prohibition of Title VII
against discrimination "because of' race protects all racial groups.34 4 To
favor minorities with racial preferences is to disfavor non-minorities.345
Affirmative action therefore perverts the goal of "colorblindness" by
fostering racial inequality directed against whites.34 6  Such reverse
discrimination sometimes punishes innocent whites who may never have
practiced racial discrimination, and it benefits blacks who may never
have experienced racial bias. 347  Critics of affirmative action also
complain that, although the law requires affirmative action plans to be
based on flexible goals that merely take race into account as one factor,
in practice, such plans adopt illegal quotas. 348 Quotas exclude whites in
344. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 222 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "Title VII's explicit prohibition on all racial
discrimination in employment" bars race-conscious affirmative action).
345. See M. ALl RAZA, A. JANELL ANDERSON & HARRY GLYNN CUSTRED, JR., THE
UPS AND DowNs OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PREFERENCES 4 (1999) (stating that "[t]o prefer
one group over another because of race means discrimination against members of another
group in order to accommodate the quota," and arguing that preferences are especially
unfair because they are enforced at the expense of many who never practiced
discrimination and who may themselves be underprivileged).
346. See Associated Press, Bush Taps 5 as Recess Appointees, COM. APPEAL, Mar.
30, 2002, at Al 0 (reporting that Gerald Reynolds, Assistant Secretary of Education for
Civil Rights, has called affirmative action "a corrupt system of preferences, set-asides
and quotas").
347. See SPANN, supra note 3, at 1 (acknowledging that even most opponents of
affirmative action concede the abuses of past discrimination beginning with slavery and
continuing into the civil rights era); RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS,
RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996) (criticizing affirmative action policy for
promoting the belief that, regardless of individual situations, every black deserves a
preference over every white).
348. See W. AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE
STALLED QUEST FOR BLACK PROGRESS 16 (1996) (presenting the conservative argument
that affirmative action violates equality of opportunity and the free market system);
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the same way that historical discrimination froze out blacks.
The response is that minorities carry the burden of discrimination in
education, housing, and employment.3 49 The myth of racial inferiority
has indelibly stained African-Americans with stereotypes. 350  Although
Title VII and changing social mores have improved the lot of some
blacks, progress is often halting and sometimes indiscernible.35 1 Using
the principle of racial equality to retain the status quo mires blacks in
perpetual inequality.352 It is fine, in theory, to treat all people "equally,"
but, when one group has overwhelming advantages over another, it is
deceptive to say that boosting the opportunities of the disadvantaged
violates the equality principle. 353  Congress sought to eradicate racial
injustice when it passed Title VII. Using Title VII to abolish affirmative
action, one of the most potent weapons in combating discrimination,
would confound the very purpose of the statute.354
Opponents argue that a fundamental American value is to reward
merit rather than status.355 Jobs should go to the most qualified person.
Affirmative action betrays this value by awarding jobs to blacks less
NIJOLE R. BENOKRAITIS & JOE R. FEAGIN, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY: ACTION, INACTION, REACTION 172-73 (1978) (comparing the view of
opponents-that quotas are rampant-to the response of supporters-that the quota issue
is a contrivance of those who oppose affirmative action).
349. See RONNIE BERNARD TUCKER, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND POLITICAL POWER IN THE OLD CONFEDERACY 27 (1999) (reporting statistics showing
that blacks are much more likely to be fired than whites); Jim Chen, Diversity and
Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1840 (1996) (asserting that in America today color
shapes every aspect of life including family formation, housing, education, employment,
political representation, and criminal justice).
350. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1060, 1067 (1991) (arguing that as a society we must move from "colorblindness"
to race-consciousness because ingrained cognitive assumptions, deeper than stereotypes,
portray blacks as incompetent and even immoral).
351. See TUCKER, supra note 349, at 28-29 (summarizing arguments that Title VII has
failed to curtail discrimination and that the plight of African-Americans, especially
African-American men, has worsened); GERALD HORNE, REVERSING DISCRIMINATION 38-
41 (1992) (citing statistics that show the deepening gap between black unemployment
and white unemployment).
352. See Amanda Knuteson, Equality Commission Vice Chair Praises Affirmative
Action, DAILY CARDINAL, Apr. 11, 2000 (reporting that Paul Igasaki, Vice Chair of the
EEOC, commented: "Without affirmative action, pipelines to many professions would be
cut off to many minorities"), available at 2000 WL 17593066.
353. See Nathaniel R. Jones, The Sisyphean Impact on Houstonian Jurisprudence, 69
U. CIN. L. REV. 435, 451 (2001) (urging the courts "to reject the bogus sacrosanctness
[sic] of color-blind remedial jurisprudence").
354. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (stating
that "it would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of
racial injustice ... constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private,
race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy").
355. See BENOKRAITIS & FEAGIN, supra note 348, at 180-81; Peter H. Schuck,
Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 24 (2002).
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qualified and therefore less deserving than some of their non-black
competitors. 356 To hire less qualified blacks is not only unfair but it is
also inefficient because less qualified workers are apt to be less
productive.
The flaw in the merit argument is that arbitrary and unfair merit
standards perpetuate unequal access to jobs. A white interviewer may
prefer a white applicant to a black applicant because the white applicant
is a better "fit., 357  Such subtle and often subconscious discrimination
will likely elude detection by civil rights law. Similarly, requiring
credentials such as a college education or a high score on an aptitude test
favors whites, because our society subjects African-Americans to
educational disadvantage. Such credentials, some argue, fail in
predicting job performance 358 but succeed in entrenching whites into
positions of dominance. 359 Regarding unfairness to non-blacks, it is true
that for every African-American who gets a job because of affirmative
action others are denied. However, a vibrant national economy provides
millions of job opportunities. To lose one or two opportunities over a
lifetime is not to endure personal catastrophe. Affirmative action does
not scuttle the dreams of whites who still land the vast majority of high-
paying, high-profile jobs.36 °
Critics of affirmative action also cite psychological and practical
considerations.361  They contend that affirmative action backfires by
stigmatizing supposed beneficiaries and undermining their confidence.362
When a plan results in hiring or promoting an African-American, the
beneficiary will wonder whether the decision was simply the gift of a
quota system. Questioning the fairness of such decisions, qualified but
rejected non-minority candidates resent minority workers and their
employers.363  Teamwork suffers; productivity declines. Furthermore,
356. See BENOKRAITIS & FEAGIN, supra note 348, at 180-81.
357. See Schuck, supra note 355 (noting that some white workers resist taking orders
from black supervisors).
358. See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming
the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REv. 953, 977 (1996) (arguing that the meritocracy
argument, based on assessing ability with standardized tests, is flawed because such tests
fail to predict the very performance they claim to measure and may actually award traits
like docility and conformity, which clash with creative job performance).
359. See BENoKRAITIS & FEAGIN, supra note 348, at 181-82 (reporting the view that
the use of quantifiable performance related measures should replace reliance on unfair
subjectivity and non-predictive credentials).
360. See TUCKER, supra note 349, at 30 (noting that white men still dominate mid-
level and upper level management in both the public and private sector).
361. See Schuck, supra note 355, at 27.
362. See id. (raising the argument that even minority applicants who deserve
favorable treatment under traditional merit criteria will encounter stigmatization if they
were hired or promoted under an affirmative action plan).
363. See SPANN, supra note 3, at 8-9 (pointing out that critics of affirmative action
20031
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
critics observe that the principle beneficiaries of affirmative action are
often those minority workers who need help least.364 The impoverished,
who are trapped in the ghetto, are not going to get managerial positions
at Exxon Mobile or admission into a prestigious law school. These
opportunities go to middle-class blacks whose parents or grandparents
365left the depredations of the ghetto long ago.
Claims that affirmative action will harm the self-images of minority
workers are not persuasive. The positive effects of getting a better job or
education outweigh any minor self-doubts that may crop up and
disappear once the minority worker has succeeded at the job.366 It is the
impact on society, in any event, that is most important. Affirmative
action will help achieve parity between blacks and whites. The
beneficiaries of affirmative action often enrich their communities as
doctors, lawyers, teachers, and entrepreneurs.367 Nor is affirmative
action so pervasive that it threatens cohesion in the workplace. As noted,
the white population is not the emerging, new underclass. Nor should
critics worry that the least needy ultimately benefit from affirmative
action; all blacks, even those in the middle class, endure discrimination
368in areas such as housing, pay, susceptibility to crime, and stereotyping.
2. Specific Arguments Against Mandatory Affirmative Action
Some may argue that mandatory affirmative action, as proposed in
this article, overburdens even those employers who violate Title VII.
369
Devising and carrying out an affirmative action plan may be an onerous
argue that resentment corrodes social cohesion).
364. One scholar argues that affirmative action has two contradictory elements. On
the one hand, it awards jobs to the most qualified women and minorities, but, on the other
hand, it aspires to improve the lives of the most needy. ALAN H. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 90-91 (1979). Those who are most qualified, however, tend to
be the least needy. Id. Alan H. Goldman states: "If the reason why minority-group
members tend to be less qualified for various positions is to be found in prior patterns of
discrimination, then those who are now most qualified will tend to be those discriminated
against least in the past." Id.
365. See supra notes 347-60 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the
undeserving benefit from affirmative action).
366. See Schuck, supra note 355, at 28 (noting that affirmative action does not
correlate with low self-esteem).
367. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 937 (2001) (citing anecdotal
evidence that "legions" of the beneficiaries of affirmative action return to under-served
communities).
368. See Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative
Action, 7 MICH. RACE L.J. 1, 11 (2001) (identifying many areas in which blacks today are
subject to disadvantage).
369. See Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,480-81
(1986) (sustaining court-ordered affirmative action where the violation was "egregious").
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undertaking. A plan may saddle an employer with costs of development
and administration that might tax or even jeopardize the financial health
of the company. Formulating a valid plan and measuring its success
against pre-established benchmarks will absorb the time of legal and
human resource personnel. The employer may need the services of
consultants to recommend goal adjustments, and the services of
statisticians to construct and assess tests and to gather and analyze
demographic data. Ongoing accountability to the court may require the
services of outside attorneys.
Although these concerns are legitimate, they do not present
insurmountable problems. A district court should consider the
seriousness of the violation. If the violation is unintentional and if the
offender appears cooperative, as in Harrison, the plan should impose
modest cost and inconvenience. In every case, the court should consider
the feasibility and probability of success of an affirmative action plan,
whether proposed by the violator or a court-appointed administrator, or
developed by the court itself. The court should not impose a plan so
costly in development and administration that it would unduly harm the
employer. The scope and provisions of such a plan must mesh with the
company's capabilities and financial resources. If the employer rectifies
the workplace imbalance on its own, the court would not impose any
affirmative action plan because the grounds for such relief would be
removed.
Another argument against mandatory affirmative action is that it
forces an employer to hire African-Americans who may never have
encountered discrimination at the hands of that employer. The remedy
does not match the offense. This criticism may be factually true, but the
justification for mandatory affirmative action is to eliminate a statistical
civil rights violation. The justification is not to find jobs for out-of-work
African-Americans. The offender can hardly argue that the most
effective means of removing the violation is unfair, simply because he
never violated the rights of some of the incidental beneficiaries of the
affirmative action plan. As long as the plan is narrowly tailored and
terminates when the offender's workforce is in balance with the relevant
labor market, the offender has no grounds to complain.
Some may oppose mandatory affirmative action on the ground that
the courts should not undertake the task of allocating jobs to one group
over another. 370 The economy thrives when business runs its own affairs.
370. See supra notes 347 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that
innocent third parties suffer from affirmative action). One author recommends that, when
a court orders preferential relief, the employer should compensate those who lose job
opportunities because of the affirmative action. J. Hoult Verkerke, Compensating
Victims of Preferential Employment Discrimination Remedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479, 1496-
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This argument is correct only to a point. Generally courts should let
employers make their own personnel decisions, but, when an employer
engages in a statistical violation of civil rights law, courts must
intervene. The proposal in this article minimizes the scope of judicial
intrusion into the affairs of business. When the violation ends, the plan
must terminate.
Finally, one might argue, relying on Sheet Metal Workers, that
mandatory court-ordered affirmative action is unconstitutional because
only "persistent or egregious" violations, rather than ordinary violations,
justify such extraordinary relief.37' The response is that any illegal
pattern and practice or disparate impact is serious. Unless a court
compels affirmative action, the past effects of the illegal practices will
continue. As long as the plan is narrowly tailored, it is consistent with
equal protection and due process. For those who reject this constitutional
analysis, this article proposes a fallback position: court-ordered
affirmative action could withstand the most demanding constitutional
scrutiny if it were mandated only in "egregious or persistent" cases
within the meaning of Sheet Metal Workers.3 72 In other words, rather
than a discretionary remedy in "egregious or persistent" cases,
affirmative action would be mandatory, but only in those cases. At the
very least, affirmative action should be a discretionary remedy for all
statistical violations based on race.
IV. Conclusion
The controversy over what remedies should be available to
disadvantaged minorities seems never to abate. The argument is a
nagging splinter in the body politic. Issues debated in 1964 occupy
scholars today. Opinions voiced on television news programs echo
concerns raised in Congress forty years ago. Some advocate more
drastic approaches such as the payment of reparations, 373 while others
97 (1989).
371. 478 U.S. at 476.
372. Id.
373. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing the
complaint of black Americans seeking $100,000,000 in reparations for ancestral
enslavement); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparation: Japanese-American Redress and
African-American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REv. 477, 517-19 (1998) (arguing that advocates of
reparations should shift the debate to "repairing" the material deficits of black American,
by stressing the importance of rebuilding schools, churches, and medical clinics,
distributing money to those in need, and transferring land to those who are dispossessed);
Note, Bridging the Color Line: The Power of African-American Reparations To Redirect
America's Future, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1689, 1701-02 (2002) (arguing that traditional
remedies directed at identifiable victims of specific discriminatory practices are
inadequate to repair the lingering effects of slavery and Jim Crow, and that a grass roots
effort is necessary to reshape the political debate).
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complain that even voluntary affirmative action goes too far.
Affirmative action is akin to reasonable accommodation. They may
not be identical twins, but they are hard to tell apart. Both remedies seek
to rid the disadvantaged of the debilitating effects of obstacles to
employment. The symptoms hindering the physically and mentally
disabled are more palpable than those that hinder racial minorities, but
the effects are the same. An education that ended after the seventh grade
is a burden. Life in an impoverished environment is another burden.
Immersion in a society that tells you on television, in magazines, on the
street, and in the workplace that you are not as worthy as white people is
perhaps the greatest burden of all. Societally induced racial disability
deserves the same legal recognition as physical and mental disabilities.
The stereotype of racial inferiority is as harmful as the belief that the
disabled are incapable of putting in a good day's work.
If affirmative action is viewed as a reasonable accommodation, it
should, for the sake of consistency in the law, be mandatory in
appropriate cases. The issue becomes how to fashion the mandatory
remedy consistent with constitutional principles. Sheet Metal Workers
and Paradise have blessed court-ordered affirmative action, but Croson
and Adarand require that court-ordered affirmative action meet the strict
scrutiny test. The government has a compelling state interest in
eradicating discrimination. This compelling state interest justifies
mandatory court-ordered affirmative action in appropriate cases.
Disparate impact and pattern and practice cases are ripe for mandatory
court-ordered affirmative action because both types of violations involve
statistical disparities between the employer's workforce and the relevant
labor market. Affirmative action is an indispensable method for
rectifying such disparities. As long as the plan is narrowly tailored,
mandatory court-ordered affirmative action in such cases satisfies strict
scrutiny.
To ensure fairness and efficacy, affirmative action plans should be
subject to continuing judicial supervision. The district court presiding
over the case should have the authority, at the remedy stage, to order the
defendant or a court-appointed administrator to submit a mandatory
affirmative action plan for judicial consideration. The plan could
propose any of a number of strategies including race-conscious hiring
and training practices and special educational, supervisory, and
apprenticeship programs for minorities. Before approving the plan, the
court should consider the plan's feasibility and probability of success,
giving due consideration to the company's financial condition and its
other resources.
Mandatory court-ordered affirmative action would present a
controversial addition to civil rights law. Some would argue that the
2003]
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proposal would oppress employers responsible merely for unintentional
violations of Title VII. It is true that mandatory court-ordered
affirmative action, as proposed in this article, would raise the stakes for
offenders. But, in doing so, it might deter violations. Although disparate
impact is by definition unintentional, employers faced with the prospect
of mandatory affirmative action would likely sift through their
employment practices to rid themselves of those that might instigate an
unhappy judicial encounter. Critics will object that the proposal would
erect obstacles blocking non-minority workers from employment
opportunities. One might better focus, however, on the other side of the
argument: The proposal would foster equality of opportunity for the
population of African-Americans, and achieving such equality is at the
heart of civil rights law.
